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NOTES
WASTING AWAY AGAIN: FACING THE LOW-LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DEBACLE IN THE UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTrON

As children, we were all taught that when we make a mess, it is our
responsibility to clean it up. However, this valuable lesson has apparently been lost on our fifty states. The Umted States now faces a crisis
in the disposal of low-level radioactive material which has existed for
almost two decades. Low-level radioactive waste, although less dangerous to human health than most potent forms of radioactive refuse,
nevertheless poses a substantial threat to both the nation's populace
and its environment.' Lacking an adequate supply of cost-efficient
disposal space, this waste has been slowly accumulating in power
plants, hospitals, umversities, and research laboratories since the
1970's.2 Unfortunately, low-level waste
has also found its way into
3
our oceans, bays and residential areas.
Indeed, the most ostensible reason why low-level material has not
enjoyed swift, safe, and efficient disposal in recent years is due to the
fact that our nation harbors only three facilities for its disposal. The
shortage of disposal capacity has persisted over the last twenty years
despite frequent demands for a remedy, as well as two attempts to
rectify the situation through legislation. Meanwhile, the country's
waste producers have continued to generate well over one million cubic feet of low-level waste each year.4 Tis Note seeks to understand
why previous approaches to effective low-level waste disposal have
failed, and how the United States has reached the current crisis situation in tls area.
Part I provides some techmcal and background information regardmg low-level waste, low-level waste disposal sites, and the disposal
process. The section then proceeds to examine the various aspects of
the two primary pieces of legislation which have been enacted in an
attempt to cope with low-level radioactive waste: the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (LLRWPA), 5 and the legislation
currently in force, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend1. See Carol Bradley, TransportationMishaps Taint Nuclear Waste, GANNETT
Nn-ws SERVICE, Nov. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Envirn & Energy Libraries

("[M]ore experts now believe that even the smallest dose of radiation can be dangerous.") [hereinafter TransportationMishaps].

2. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
3. See nfra notes 185-94 and accompanying text.
4. See OFFIcE OF ENVTL. RESTORATION AND WASTE MGvrr., U.S. DEP'T OF EN1989 ANNUAL REPORT ON Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
PROGRESS, DOE/EM-0006P, app. A at A-6 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 REPORT].
ERGY,

5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (1988).
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ments Act of 1985 (LLRWPAA).6 Part I ends with an analysis of a
recent Supreme Court decision, New York v. United States,7 which has
served to sound the "death-knell" for the efficacy of the LLRWPAA.
Part II focuses on the reasons for the 1985 Act's failure, and the
unfortunate consequences wich have flowed from Congress' inability
to enact an effective program for the disposal of low-level waste. The
section also identifies the need for a new direction in low-level waste
disposal legislation and identifies several concrete goals which should
ideally guide this revision.
Part III, after suggesting two important policy considerations winch
must form the foundation for devising an effective disposal system,
proceeds to advance a rather detailed blueprint for legislative reform.
The proposed scheme is then contrasted with the LLRWPAA, and defended against potential counter-arguments.
This Note concludes that the time has come for a comprehensive
federal solution to the problem and endeavors to suggest several proposals which may create a tenable disposal system.
I. BACKGROUND
Low-level radioactive waste is statutorily defined as radioactive material that is "not high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or
byproduct material."8 Furthermore, low-level waste includes any material classified as such by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).9 Despite this somewhat amorphous, negative defimtion, lowlevel radioactive waste commonly includes such items as protective
clothing, filters, solidified liquids, nuclear scintillation wastes, animal
carcasses, laboratory trash, contaminated soil, activated metals, and
failed equipment. 10 Moreover, low-level waste may manifest itself in
a liquid, solid, or gaseous state." Techmcal information was needed
to provide a more workable definition to identify low level radioactive
wastes.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021i (1988).
7. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).

8. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(9)(A) (1988).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(9)(B).
10. RONALD L. FUCHS & KIMBERLY CULBERTSON-ARENDTS, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/LLW-87, THE 1988 STATE-BY-STATE AssEssMENT OF Low-LEVEL RADIOACrIVE WASTES RECEIVED AT COMMERCIAL DIsPOsAL SrTEs, Table 4 (1989),
[hereinafter 1988 STATE-BY-STATE]; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal: Joint

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research and Development of the Senate
Comm. on Env't and Public Works on S. 1517 and S. 1578, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 540

(1985) [hereinafter 1985 Senate Hearing].
11. Dan M. Berkovitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" State Sovereignty in the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L.

REV 437, 440 (1987).
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A. Technical Information & FederalRegulation
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985
(LLRWPAA),' 2 discussed below, 13 provides a clearer picture of lowlevel waste classification. The LLRWPAA allocates responsibility to
the states for the disposal of Class A, B and C radioactive materials
(i.e., low-level waste) generated within their borders.14 These designations are based on increasing levels of radioactivity. Therefore,
within the rather broad family of low-level radioactive waste, materials may vary somewhat in terms of contamination level. This system is
more workable since it identifies wastes based not on what they appear to be, but rather, on a measurable characteristic they exhibit,
radioactivity.
1. Waste Classifications
Class A waste is considered to be relatively innocuous, containing
only 5% of the total radioactivity exhibited by low-level waste, but it
accounts for 97% of low-level waste volume.1 5 Generally, Class A
waste must be segregated from other classifications of waste in separate disposal units at the disposal facility, but it may be mixed with
higher-level wastes provided it meets certain stability requirements.' 6
Class A waste contains types and quantities of isotopes which will decay during a 100-year period so as to present an acceptable hazard to
an inadvertent intruder on a disposal site at the end of that time.' 7
Class B waste contains somewhat higher levels of radioactivity than
Class A, but also degrades during a 100-year time span.'8 Therefore,
aside from more stringent stability requirements, discussion of Class B
waste does not differ significantly from that of Class A waste.
Class C waste is the most dangerous classification of low-level
waste. Unlike Classes A and B, this waste will not decay to levels
presenting an acceptable hazard to a potential intruder on the disposal
site within a 100-year penod.' 9 As a result, Class C wastes are subject
to high stability standards and additional safety requirements.2 0 The
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021i (1988) [hereinafter LLRWPAA].
13. See infra notes 81-109 and accompanying text.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c. The low-level wastes for winch states are responsible under
the LLRWPAA are generally referred to as "commercial" wastes. In recent years,

nuclear power plants have accounted for approximately half of total commercial lowlevel waste production. The other 50% is generated by state and private research

institutions, private industry, hospitals, universities, medical labs, and certain federal
entities. U.S.

DEP'T OF ENERGY, SPENT FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE INVENTORIES, PROJECTIONS, AND CHARACTERISTICS (1984) [hereinafter SPENT FUEL]. See

also 1988 State-by-State, supra note 10, at 1.
15. 1985 Senate Hearing, supra note 10, at 542.
16. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
17. 10 C.F.R. § 61.7(b)(4) (1992).
18. Id
19. 10 C.F.R. § 61.7(b)(5).

20. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
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federal government is responsible for the disposal of all waste levels
higher than Class C,2 1 but the states must dispose of all Class A, B and
C wastes generated by the federal government within their borders. 22
2. The Disposal Facility
Class A, B and C wastes are generally suitable for disposal through
near-surface burial. This process typically involves stacking stable,
contained waste in specially engineered, unlined trenches which are
then covered with clay. 3 However, the NRC does not mandate a specific method of disposal, but rather it provides for the development of
alternative disposal technologies.24 In fact, the Commission has endorsed two such alternative methods: below-ground vaults and earthmounded concrete bunkers.' Despite the potential for future diversity in disposal techmques, some general information regarding the
current logistics of a near-surface disposal facility is appropriate.
The NRC defines a near-surface disposal facility as a land disposal
site in which radioactive waste is disposed of in or within the upper 30
meters of the Earth's surface.26 However, the NRC states that
"[b]unal deeper than 30 meters may also be satisfactory."'2 7 The disposal facility itself consists of the land and buildings2 necessary for
adequate disposal operations. The disposal site is that portion of the
facility which actually houses waste. The site is comprised of disposal
umts and a buffer zone.29 As noted above, the disposal umt in a nearsurface disposal facility is generally an engineered trench. The buffer
zone, an area reserved for early-warning momtoring of radionuclide
movement, lies under the site and is located between the site and any
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(b)(1)(D).
22. States need not provide for the disposal of federally-generated low-level waste
produced within their borders which is attributable to certain defense programs.
Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 449 n.54-55. Defense-related wastes are disposed at sites
created exclusively for use by the federal government. See, e.g., SPENT FUEL, supra
note 14. Under the LLRWPAA, the federal government is alone responsible for the
disposal of these wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(b)(1)(D).
23. Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 440. The low-level waste disposal site m Barnwell,

South Carolina uses Kalonite clay to cover trenches. This substance significantly umpedes the flow of water into and out of the sealed disposal unit. Telephone Interview
with Frank Roberts, Public Relations Manager, Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. (Oct. 28,

1992).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2021h.
25. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N. LICENSING OF ALTERNATIVE METrODS OF DISPOSAL OF Low-LEvEL RADIOACriVE WASTES, NUREG-1241, 6-7 (1986).

26. 10 C.F.R. § 61.7(a)(1).
27 Id.
28. These buildings are generally used for offices and on-site equipment maintenance. A low-level waste disposal site will also employ a complex system of roads to
facilitate access to existing disposal units. Telephone Interview with Frank Roberts,
supra note 23.

29. 10 C.F.R. § 61.7(a)(2).
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disposal umt,3 0 and thus will pick up any radionuclides migrating upward from the umt to the site.
Wastes must be properly packaged and placed within the disposal
unit so as to retain the structural integrity of the package and minimize void spaces between packages. 3 ' Void spaces must be filled with
32
earth or other material to reduce future subsidence within the fill.
3. Regulations & Requirements
The federal government retains extensive authority to regulate the
low-level waste field. Consequently, the NRC has promulgated an extensive body of regulations which govern the techmcal, monitoring,
and safety-related aspects of developing and operating a low-level
waste disposal facility 33 The NRC has also established licensing requirements and procedures which must be followed by any entity
seeking to operate a low-level waste facility. 34 These rules seek to
ensure the protection of the general population surrounding the waste
facility, to provide for the possibility of inadvertent intruders gaining
access to sites, and to safeguard those who are involved in the operation of the facility.35 Furthermore, the NRC regulations function to
guarantee the stability of the disposal umt at all times during and after
functional status has been attained.36 We now explore some of the
vehicles designed to accomplish these objectives.
a. Technical Competence
Prior to selecting a disposal site, as well as during the disposal process, operators must address in detail technical information such as
geological, hydrological, and meteorological data which may bear on
the viability of the facility. 37 In particular, the NRC seeks to avoid
siting areas which are uncommonly susceptible to erosion, flooding,
landsliding, or seismic activity. Reports must be filed with the NRC
before siting describing extensively all aspects of site design, types of
wastes to be disposed, drainage capacity, stability, monitoring measures, and tests to be used before and during operations, operational
plans, methods and areas of waste storage. The reports must also include descriptions of institutional and safety controls, potential
hazards to any valuable natural resources proximate to the facility,
and an analysis of demographic factors, population growth, and future
30. Id.
31. 10 C.F.R. § 61.52(a)(4).

32. 10 C.F.R. § 61.52(a)(5).
33. See generally 10 C.F.R. § 61.
34. 10 C.F.R. § 61.3.
35. 10 C.F.R.§ 61.7(b)(1).

36. Id.
37 10 C.F.R. §§ 61.12-13.
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development that outlines any potential hazards to surrounding
human inhabitants."
b. Stability Requirements
Stability requirements demand that the character of wastes (i.e.,
gross physical property, identity and structure) remain constant
throughout the disposal process.3 9 All classes of waste must meet certam minimum stability requirements with respect to packaging and
the solidification of liquid wastes. Mimmum stability also entails reducing the capacity of wastes to ignite, detonate or emit toxic fumes.4°
Class B and C wastes are subject to a second set of more stringent
structuralstability guidelines. These requirements demand that higher
waste classes retain physical dimension and form under the weight of
equipment, the presence of moisture and microbial activity, and the
influence of internal factors including radiation effects and chemical
changes.4 ' Wastes can be inherently structurally stable, but containers
and processing techniques may be employed to impose structural stability.42 Furthermore, Class B and C wastes cannot be placed in a
disposal unit unless they are designed to maintain gross physical property and identity for at least 300 years.43 A variety of other regulations establish detailed procedures and guidelines for stabilizing
wastes in solid, liquid and gaseous forms.
Due to its relatively innocuous nature, Class A waste need not meet
structural stability requirements. However, as noted earlier, Class A
wastes may only be mixed with Class B and C wastes if structurally
stable. 44 Therefore, structurally unstable Class A wastes must be segregated from other forms of waste at the disposal facility.
Stability requirements also contribute to the overall strength of the
site itself by minimizing the dangers of a disposal unit slumping or
collapsing, thereby limiting the access of water to the waste. 45 As a
result, the potentially deleterious migration of radionuclides is kept to
a minimum and the need for long-term, active maintenance of the site,
including the pumping and treatment of water from the disposal unit,
38. Id.
39. 10 C.F.R. §§ 61.7(b)(2), 61.56.

40. 10 C.F.R. § 61.56.
41. 10 C.F.R. § 61.56(b)(1).
42. Id.
43. 10 C.F.R. § 61.7(b)(2).
44. 10 C.F.R. § 61.55(a)(1). Experience suggests that the permissible grouping of
stable Class A, B and C wastes may be infrequently practiced. The nation's largest
existing low-level waste disposal site, located m Barnwell, South Carolina, maintains
separate trenches for each of the three classes of radioactive material. Telephone
interview with Frank Roberts, supra note 23.
45. 10 C.F.R. § 61.56(b).
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can be controlled.46 Undue hazards to inadvertent intruders are likewise avoided through stability regulations.
c. Institutional Controls
Institutional controls require the owner of a facility to physically
restrict access to the site for up to 100 years after site closure through
the implementation of a control program. Institutional controls may
not be relied upon for more than 100 years after transfer of disposal
site control to the owner, and thus this monitoring ceases at the expiration of this period.4 7
The land containing any site which receives waste from other persons must be owned m fee by the federal or a state government.48 The
institutional control program adopted by the owner must include the
performance of minor custodial activities, access restriction duties,
regular environmental monitoring assessments including soil testing
around the site, and periodic surveillance. 49 These regulations exist in
order to protect members of the general population from exposure to
radiation after facility operations have ceased. 50 The guidelines also
insure that the disposal unit will not be disturbed or used improperly
after closure.
Class A and B wastes, which decay to relatively benign levels of
radioactivity within 100 years, are not subject to any additional institutional controls beyond the century-long access restriction period.
However, Class C wastes will still present an unacceptable danger to
inadvertent intruders subsequent to the expiration of the requisite
100-year period of institutional control. Therefore, these wastes are
subject to additional "special" institutional control requirements in
the form of deeper burial, or alternatively, the construction of intruder barriers. The burial option demands that the apex of Class C
waste stacked within the disposal unit must be at least five meters
below the top surface of the cover.' Where deeper burial is not geologically feasible, intruder barriers such as concrete covers are
designed to protect inadvertent intruders for a 500-year period. 2
4. Disposal Operations and the Licensing Process
The process through which an NRC license applicant obtains a license and operates a disposal facility is divided into four main phases:
pre-operational, operational, closure and stabilization and institu46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

10 C.F.R.
10 C.F.R.
10 C.F.R.
10 C.F.R.
10 C.F.R.
10 C.F.R.
Id.

§ 61.7(b)(2).
§ 61.7(b)(4).
§ 61.14(b).
§ 61.59(b).
§ 61.7(b)(4).
§ 61.52(a)(2).
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tional control. The following sections discuss the specifics of these
phases.
a. Pre-OperationalPhase
During this period, the potential applicant selects a region of interest for siting and eventually narrows the area until a precise location
for the site is found. 53 Detailed investigation of disposal site characteristics pursuant to the requirements described in section 3(c), above,
yields data for the assessment of the long-term suitability of the proposed site. NRC review of the application may involve the participation of affected state governments. Although the site must be owned
by a state or federal government before the NRC will issue a license,
private ownership is permitted during the pre-operational phase provided that arrangements have been5 4made for the government to take
title to the land prior to licensing.
This requirement of governmental ownership can be misleading,
however, m terms of the level of private involvement in the siting and
disposal process. State governments generally contract with private
compames to site, build, develop and operate disposal facilities for
commercial low-level waste.5 5 Private operators usually lease the
sited land from the state government for an annual fee. The lesseeoperator will then charge private waste producers for disposal by the
cubic foot. Although the state government and the NRC each receive
a substantial portion of these fees, disposal operations generally remain profitable for the private lessee company. 56 Of course, private
operators are subject to all of the NRC regulations outlined above.
b.

OperationalPhase

During this phase, the licensed private lessee-operator carries out
disposal activities in accord with NRC regulations. Waste generators
are responsible for the proper packaging, preparation and transportation of waste prior to actual disposal at the facility. Inspectors authorized by the state and the private lessee-operator momtor on-site
operations and randomly select waste containers for safety evaluation.
53. 10 C.F.R. § 61.7(c)(1).
54. Id.
55. In 1988, the top five contractors for low-level waste disposal activities were: 1)
Chem-Nuclear Systems, 2) U.S. Ecology, 3) Hittman Nuclear, 4) LN Technologies
Corp., and 5) Pacific Nuclear Systems. These firms held roughly 76.2% of the market
in 1987 with revenues approximating $281.7 million. Elaine Hiruo, Low-Level Waste
Businesses Vying for Shrinking Market, NUCLEONICS WK., Aug. 18, 1988, at 7 [hereinafter Hiruo I].
56. See Senator Gary W Hart & Keith R. Glaser, A Failure to Enact: A Review of
RadioactiveWaste Issues and Legislation Considered by the Ninety-Sixth Congress,32
S. CAL. L. REv 639, 781 (1981) ("[Tihe entry of private firms into the [low-level
waste] field has shown that low-level waste disposal can survive as a commercially
viable enterprise.
").
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The private site operator is then responsible for the proper placement
of waste within the disposal unit. New trenches are constructed yearby-year as necessary and filled umts are sealed m conformity with
NRC procedure.57 Constant monitoring of site stability and performance also occurs during this phase.5" Before disposal operations are to
cease, the private lessee-operator is to submit a site closure and stabilization plan to the NRC which is subject to the Commission's review
and approval. 59
c. Closure & Stabilization Phase
Following NRC approval, the private lessee-operator performs stabilization and closure duties based on its ratified plan. The NRC requires the operator to remain on-site for a period of five years after
stabilization and closure in order to momtor and maintain the facility.
During this time the operator prepares the site for the requisite institutional control period, which is not to exceed one hundred years.6"
d. Institutional Control
Finally, title and NRC license to the land reverts back to the state
governmental owner. The government then performs all necessary institutional control activities as described above. The NRC permits
productive use of the disposal facility land during this period provided
the proposed use will not impede site stability or capacity to meet
performance objectives. 61 The NRC license is terminated at the end
of the prescribed period of institutional control.
B. Growing Crisis: Inadequate Disposal Capacity in the 1970's
In 1971, six near-surface land burial facilities for the disposal of
commercial low-level radioactive waste existed in the Umted States.62
However, environmental concerns regarding the safety of some of
these sites led to three closings in the mid-1970's.63 At present, the
57. Telephone interview with Frank Roberts, supra note 23.
58. 10 C.F.R. § 61.53.
59. 10 C.F.R. § 61.7(c)(2).
60. 10 C.F.R. § 61.7(c)(3).
61. 10 C.F.R. § 61.7(c)(4). Frank Roberts, Public Relations Manager for ChemNuclear Systems, contends that possible uses of disposal site lands during institutional
control periods include golf courses, and even crop-growing. Telephone Interview
with Frank Roberts, supra note 23.
62. These sites were located in Barnwell, South Carolina; Beatty, Nevada; Maxey
Flats, Kentucky; Richland, Washington; Sheffield, Illinois; and West Valley, New
York. Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 441 n.16.
63. The closings occurred at the Maxey Flats, Sheffield, and West Valley facilities.
GENERAL ACcOUNTING OFFIcE, THE PROBLEM OF DIsPOsING OF NUCLEAR
LEVEL WASTE: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 2 (EMD-80-68, Mar. 31,

Low-

1980)
[hereinafter GAO].
The Maxey Flats site was forced to cease operations after a contingency excise tax
imposed by the Kentucky legislature rendered future use of the site economically
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same remaining sites represent the only available disposal facilities for
commercial low-level waste m the country. These sites are located in
Barnwell, South Carolina; Hanford (Richland), Washington; and
Beatty, Nevada.
Nevertheless, these three facilities were not able to avoid setbacks
of their own. In 1979, the Beatty site in Nevada was forced to temporarily cease operations due to faulty rn-state management of several
low-level waste shipments.6t Similarly, the Hanford facility in Washmgton also faced a hiatus in 1979 after experiencing both transportation and packaging difficulties.6 5 Thus, the South Carolina site was
saddled, during an alarming period, with roughly 80% of the nation's
low-level waste.66 Concerned for the welfare of his state, Governor
Riley ordered the Barnwell site to halve its intake of waste material. 67
This temporary crisis capped what had been a rising national concern
over the low-level radioactive waste disposal crisis. It had become
abundantly clear that the development of additional facilities would
be necessary if the United States was to safely and effectively accommodate its immediate and long-term, low-level waste disposal needs.
The use of only three sites for the disposal of the total waste output
was justifiably viewed as an untenable and potentially hazardous
arrangement.
Obviously, the impending crisis' most substantial impact was on the
three "sited" states. In addition to the undeniable supply and demand
disparity, the plight of these states was exacerbated by a 1978
Supreme Court decision. In City of Philadelphiav New Jersey,68 the
Court held that waste materials were properly viewed as articles of
69
commerce, and thus fell within the ambit of the Commerce Clause.
This clause was then construed, consistent with its history, to prohibit
state discrimination against out-of-state waste when determining
whether to accept hazardous waste at an in-state disposal facility. 0
unattractive to generators. Id. at 3. However, the site had previously experienced the
accumulation of dangerous levels of water within disposal trenches. Berkovitz, supra
note 11, at 441 n.17. Likewise, the West Valley site was forced to close after radioactive waste was discovered leaking form disposal units. GAO at 3. The Sheffield site
also encountered problems with soil subsidence and water migration, Berkovitz, supra
note 11, at 441 n.17, but ultimately closed after the site operator withdrew its application to expand the capacity of the site. GAO at 3.
64. GAO, supra note 63, at 4.
65. H.R. REP. No. 314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 17 (1985).
66. Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 441.

67. Id.

68. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
69. Id. at 622-23.
70. For examples of the Supreme Court's willingness to invalidate state laws which
unfairly discriminate against interstate commerce, see Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers,
Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (holding unconstitutional the Florida statute intended to prevent out-of-state banks from entering the Florida mvestment-advisory market); Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (striking North
Carolina statute requiring all closed containers of apples shipped into or sold within
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Therefore, the three sited states were constitutionally unable to limit
use of their disposal sites to waste generated within their respective
borders.
The mandate of the Supreme Court aside, the events which took
place m 1979 induced the sited states to attempt, albeit unsuccessfully,
to curtail the levels of out-of-state waste admitted to their facilities.
Such unrest led Congress to consider a federal solution to the disposal
dilemma. 7 '

C. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980
Fearing federal intervention into an area fraught with sensitive environmental, political and health-related concerns, the unsited states
were able to convince Congress to give them the first crack at developing a comprehensive low-level radioactive waste disposal policy.
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980
The result was
72

(LLRWPA).
The LLRWPA was premised on the theory that, although some federal regulation m the low-level waste field was both desirable and necessary, the process of siting new disposal facilities was best handled at
the state level. Indeed, this policy is explicitly included in the language of the legislation.73 Another fundamental precept of the Act
asserted that the low-level waste disposal process was most efficiently
handled on a regional basis, 74 although each state was to be held responsible for the waste generated within its borders. 75
The regional system was to be achieved through the establishment
of several interstate compacts. 76 Subject to the approval of Congress,
states would be permitted to band together in clearly-defined groups
in order to provide for the disposal of all low-level waste produced

within their particular region.77 After January 1, 1986, each compact
would receive congressional authority to limit the use of its disposal
the state to bear either a U.S. grade marking or no grade); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951) (invalidating Madison, Wisconsin law mandating that out-of-state
milk processors pasteurize their product within five miles of the city).
71. Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 442-43. Despite the Philadelplua v. New Jersey
decision, in 1980, Washington voters approved an initiative barring all out-of-state
waste from the Hanford (Richland) disposal facility. Id. The initiative was later
deemed unconstitutional. Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom., Don't Waste Washington
Legal Defense Found. v. Washington, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(1).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1)(A).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(2). States are able to enter into interstate compacts by
negative inference from an Article I provision which states in relevant part: "No
enter into any Agreement or ComState shall, without the Consent of Congress
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
pact with another State or with a foreign power.
77 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(2).
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facilities to waste generated within the compact.78 Therefore, each
state was essentially required to either develop its own low-level waste
disposal facility or enter into an interstate compact for the purposes of
such disposal by January 1, 1986. Failure to meet that deadline would
leave the state with no available disposal site as exclusionary power
for the compacts became effective.
However, the LLRWPA eventually proved ineffectual. By 1983 it
had become apparent that many states would be unable to meet the
1986 deadline. 79 Legitimate technical obstacles and political stalling
caused the siting process to fall behind schedule. By 1985, although
thirty-seven states had tentatively entered into compacts, no compacts
were ratified, no new sites had been identified, and no new disposal
facilities had been constructed. Crisis was renewed as the three sited
states threatened to exclude out-of-region waste from the compacts
they had formed unless Congress took action by January 1, 1986.80
D

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act

of 1985
Once again the states were able to avoid the firm hand of federal
regulation; Congress was convinced to enact compromse legislation in
the form of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985 (LLRWPAA). 81 Under the revised scheme, unsited states
were allowed access to the three existing facilities until January 1,
1993.82 At that time, Congressional exclusionary authority for all
compacts would become effective. In return, unsited states were required to meet certain milestones in order to ensure continued access
to disposal sites during the interim period. Sited states were also permitted to cap the quantity of waste accepted at specified levels. Finally, sited states were able to collect surcharges on all waste shipped
from outside their compact regions. When Congress passed the
LLRWFAA, it simultaneously ratified seven interstate compacts.8 3
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(c).
79. See, e.g., Status of Interstate Compactsfor the Disposalof Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 1st. Sess. 2
(1983) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
80. 1985 Senate Hearing,supra note 10, at 249-51 (statement of Gov. Booth Gardner, State of Washington).
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(a).
83. The seven compacts as originally ratified in 1985 under the LLRWPAA are as
follows: 1) Northwest Compact: Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming; 2) Central Compact: Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Oklahoma; 3) Southeast Compact: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virgima; 4) Central Midwest Compact: Illinois and Kentucky; 5) Midwest
Compact: Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin; 6)
Rocky Mountain Compact: Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyornng; 7) Northeast Compact: Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland.
42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d).
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Although the LLRWPAA does not require individual states to join
compacts, Congress did not explicitly provide exclusionary authority
for "go-it-alone states." Consequently, without this necessary congressional consent, states which fail to choose the regional approach
are otherwise subject to the obligation (created in City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey)84 of non-discriminatorily accepting waste from other
states.85 Tils unpalatable option provides a strong incentive for states
to join compacts.
1.

Quantity Limits

The LLRWPAA imposes the following ceiling levels on the quantity
by the three existing
of low-level radioactive waste to be accepted
86
sites from the unsited states and regions:
Maximum Waste Level
Site Location
(effective 1/1/86 through 12/31/92)
* 8,400,000 cubic feet
* Barnwell, SC
* 9,800,000 cubic feet
* Hanford (Richland), WA
* 1,400,000 cubic feet
* Beatty, NV
These levels were established m order to ensure that the three sited
states would not be required to accept levels of waste during the interim period greater than amount they received prior to 1986Y In
addition to protecting the interests of the sited states, Congress felt
84. 437 U.S. 617
85. Some commentators have examined two primary ways m which "go it alone"
states might achieve exclusionary authority by invoking constitutional principles. One
potential avenue involves the "quarantine exception," wich has traditionally allowed
the Supreme Court to approve state exclusion of inherently noxious materials. See,
e.g., Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908) (permitting state exclusion of diseased livestock). However, at least two authors agree that, m light of recent cases including
Philadelphiav. New Jersey, an argument based on the "quarantine exception" is unlikely to survive scrutiny. L. David Condon, The Never Ending Story: Low-Level
Waste and the ExclusionaryAuthority of Noncompacting States, 30 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 65, 78 (1990); James W Conrad, Jr., Note, Glowing Their Own Way: State Embargoes and Exclusive Waste-Disposal Sites Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, 53 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv 654, 676 (1985).
Another suggested method would implicate the "market participant doctrine," first
announced m Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). This doctrine
essentially posits that, when a state enters an industry as a private actor m the free
market, it is capable of choosing its customers as well as the terms of its dealings with
other actors. Id. at 809-10. Once again, significant obstacles are envisioned for "go it
alone" states attempting to achieve exclusionary power in the low-level waste field
through this method. See Condon, supra, at 80-84; Conrad, supra, at 676-78. However, other commentators have expressed considerable optimism with regard to this
state use of the "market participant doctrine." See, e.g., Joseph R. Prochaska, LowLevel Radioactive Waste Disposal Compacts, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 383, 396400 (1986).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021e(b)(1)-(b)(3).
87. Id.
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that these limits would cause each site to fill at approximately uniform
rates.88
2. Milestones, Surcharges & Rebates
The LLRWPAA also provides that unsited states can only secure
access to existing disposal facilities from 1986 to 1993 by achieving
specific milestones. The deadline for the first step in the siting process
was July 1, 1986. Non-compact member states were required to ratify
compact legislation or, if the state had decided to "go it alone," evince
its intent to construct a disposal facility within its own borders.8 9
Next, unsited compacts had to specify the state in which its facility
would be located by January 1, 1988.90 Siting plans for both independent states and non-sited compacts were also due on this date. 9 '
In addition, a January 1, 1990 deadline for the filing of applications
for licensure or certifications with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established. 2 The certification option was included
in the legislation because legitimate technical obstacles were seen to
exist which could prevent a state or region from attaining disposal capacity by the 1993 cut-off date. In 1983, the NRC determined that the
period between the choice of a compact host state and development of
a sitmg plan and actual viability of the new disposal facility may range
from three to four years. 93 Since siting plans and selection of a compact facility site were not to be due until January 1, 1988, the NRC
recognized that all new disposal sites may not be completed until
1995. Therefore, based on the NRC's most conservative estimates, the
LLRWPAA imposed a final deadline for new site operation effective
January 1, 1996. 91 Failure to meet this ultimate milestone will trigger
the LLRWPAA's "take title" provision, discussed below.95 Hence,
the LLRWPAA permits states and compacts to open sites at some
time after 1993. However, both "go it alone" unsited states and compacts are held responsible for the disposal, storage, or management of
their own waste for the period between January 1, 1993 (the date exclusionary power is granted to the sited compacts) and January 1, 1996
(final deadline for new sites), although this burden can be shifted to
88. S.

REP.

No. 199, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1985).

89. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1).

90. Id.
91. Id.

92. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1)(C). The certification option requires non-sited compacts and "go it alone" states to provide for the disposal, storage, or management of
their waste after December 31, 1992 if the state or region will be unable to open a
facility by that date. A state or region which selects the certification route must nevertheless file a complete application for the operation of a disposal facility by January
1, 1992. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1)(D).
93. Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 445 n.40.

94. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
95. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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waste generators within the state or region.9 6 Despite these mtricacies, the timing provisions of the LLRWPAA seek to provide clearly
defined temporal limits for the siting process m both compact-member
and "go it alone" states.
The LLRWPAA also utilizes a system of surcharges which serves to
enforce deadlines and compensate the three sited states. These states
were initially authorized to subject waste generators to extra fees over
and above the usual disposal charges. These surcharges were fixed as
follows: $10 per cubic foot in 1986 and 1987, $20 per cubic foot in
1988 and 1989, and $40 per cubic foot in 1990 through 1992.97 Compensation, encouragement of low-level waste volume reduction and
the creation of incentive to hasten the siting process in the unsited
states and regions provided the rationale behind these graduated
rates.98
Costs are also imposed for failure to meet the milestones described
above. Penalty fees accrue as non-sited states or regions fail to comply with LLRWPAA guidelines. The rate of these surcharges is graduated, increasing by a fixed multiple of the standard disposal
payment.9 9 Thus, a state or region that fails to meet the January 1,
1988 deadline will be forced to pay penalties to the applicable disposal
facility of [2 x Standard Surcharge Rates ($20 per cubic foot for 198889)] for a maximum of six months until the milestone is attained.
Thereafter, the charge becomes four times the standard rate for an
additional six months. After this twelve month "grace period" has
expired, sited states are permitted to deny access to the delinquent
state or compact. 10° No grace period is allowed for missing the 1990
milestone, and access may be immediately revoked. 10 1 Failure to meet
the 1992 goal results in triple surcharges until a complete application
for siting is filed with the NRC.1' 2 Congress apparently felt that this
combination of grace periods and monetary penalties would serve to
prevent sudden access cut-offs while still providing incentives to take
affirmative and rapid steps toward siting facilities. In contrast to the
penalty provisions, the LLRWPAA also granted limited surcharge rebates in order to encourage compliance with the dictates of the legislation. 0 3 States or compacts meeting a given milestone are entitled to a
25% rebate of the sum of the surcharges collected by the sited states
since the previous deadline." ° States or regions with disposal capability, as opposed to mere capacity to store or manage low-level waste,
96.
97.
98.
99.

42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1).
Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 452.
42 U.S.C. § 2021e(c)(2)

100. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(2)(A)(ii).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(2)(C).

102. 42 u.s.c. § 2021e(e)(2)(D).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2).
104. Id.
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by January 1, 1993 are entitled to a 25% rebate of surcharges collected
from January 1, 1990 through December 31, 1992.105 Since either the
state itself or the private waste generators within each state or region
must provide for the management or storage of wastes if actual disposal capacity is not attained by January 1, 1993, a rather complex post1993 rebate mechanism also exists. 06 The applicable provisions essentially serve to partially compensate the party which assumes flus
responsibility.
3. The "Take Title" Provision
The linchpin of the LLRWPAA was the "take title" provision. This
portion of the statute provided that any state (compact member or
non-compact member) which was unable to provide for the disposal
of its low-level waste by January 1, 1996 could be compelled, at the
request of any waste generator within the state, to take title to, possession of, and all liability for that generator's waste.1 7 Although viewed
by some members of Congress as harsh and unnecessary, the Senate
ultimately concluded that without this explicit sanction, states would
not have sufficient incentive to comply with the LLRWPAA. 108 However, the words of Representative Markey later proved prophetic:
"[t]he provision may not pass a constitutional challenge...." 10 9
E. The Death of the "State Solution"- New York v. United States
In June 1992, the Supreme Court passed judgment on the constitutionality of the LLRWPAA of 1985. The case of New York v. United
States" ° was brought by the State of New York which claimed that the
monetary, access-restricting and "take title" incentives created by the
Act were each inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution."' New York had chosen to exercise the "go it alone" option,
complying with the LLRWPAA by enacting legislation which provided for the siting and financing of a New York site to be constructed
in one of five potential localities." 2
The Court initially noted that any Tenth Amendment challenge
must demonstrate that Congress, through its legislation, had unconstitutionally exceeded its Article I powers and thus infringed upon state
sovereignty. 113 "Indeed, the Tenth Amendment 'states but a truism
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv).

106. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
107 Id.
108. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 38,405 (1985) (statement of Sen. Hart) (fearing that
the lack of a "take title" provision would cause states to shift the burden of waste
disposal to private generators).
109. Id. at 38,117 (statement of Rep. Markey).
110. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
111. Id. at 2417
112. Id. at 2416-17
113. Id. at 2418.
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that all [power] is retained [by the states] which has not been surrendered [to the federal government].""' 4 The fundamental inquiry,
therefore, was whether state sovereignty in the low-level waste disposal arena was protected by some limit on the Article I powers exercised by Congress in enacting the LLRWPAA of 1985. If so, the
provisions of the Act would be found unconstitutional.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, posited that the
LLRWPAA of 1985 was constitutionally grounded in the Commerce
Clause, the taxing power, the Spending Clause, and the Supremacy
Clause. 5 The Court recognized that the Article I powers, dealing
with regulation of interstate commerce, 16 federal taxing 117 and federal spending, 8 have proved highly expansive throughout the history
of American constitutional interpretation. As broad readings of these
powers have been reaffirmed over the decades, the federal government has gradually realized increasing levels of authority to tax, spend
and regulate interstate commerce, consequently dimnmshing those
powers reserved exclusively to the states through the Tenth
Amendment. 1 9
However, the crux of New York's challenge to the LLRWPAA provisions was that Congress had impermissibly ordered the states to regulate in the low-level waste disposal field, not that the Tenth
Amendment reserved all power to regulate low-level waste to the
states. Indeed, New York recognized that the space m disposal sites,
frequently sold by residents of one state to residents of another, was a
suitable subject for federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. 20
114. Id. at 2418 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
115. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2418-19.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

117. Id
118. Id
119. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2418-19. The current view of the Tenth Amendment as
a limit on federal power is expressed m Garcia v. San Antomo Metro. Transit Auth.,

469 U.S. 528 (1985). That decision supplanted the earlier test, announced in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which held that Congress could not
exercise legislative power over the states in areas deemed to fall within. the category

of "traditional governmental functions." Id. at 852. Under Garcia,protection of state
sovereignty was to be achieved through "procedural safeguards inherent in the

federal system." 469 U.S. at 552. Therefore, the mere fact that Congress, a body
whose members are elected by the states subject to state-controlled election qualifica-

tions, passes a law which is not vetoed by the President (whose election is contingent
upon state participation in the electoral college system), necessarily means that state

sovereignty has not been violated. Id. at 550-51. Consequently, the Court held that
Congress could constitutionally "enforce the minimum-wage and overtime provisions

of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against the States. " Id. at 530, 557 The
ultimate consequence of this landmark decision appears to be a great expansion of the
scope of Congress' authority to regulate the states through its various Article I
powers.

120. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2419-20.
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Moreover, New York conceded that under the Supremacy Clause' 21
Congress could entirely preempt state low-level waste legislation. Instead, New York argued that the provisions of the LLRWPAA met an
insurmountable obstacle when faced with one fundamental precept of
our federal system of government: "the Constitution has never been
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States
to govern according to Congress' mstructions."'' 2 Consistent with the
explicit intent of the Framers, Congress exercises its legislative authority over individuals, not states.123 Therefore, Justice O'Connor noted
that the Commerce Clause permits Congress to directly regulate interstate commerce, not to regulate the state governments' regulation of
interstate commerce.
Justice O'Connor nevertheless recognized that the Constitution has
long been read to permit Congress to hold out incentives for the states
m an attempt to influence their policy decisions. Such federal "suggestion" had been approved relatively recently in a case in which the
federal government sought to induce state adoption of a federally-determined drinking age by withholding a portion of federal highway
funds from those states which failed to accept the congressionally-selected minimum age.' 24 The Court continued to assert that Congress
may legitimately offer the states a choice between regulating according to federal standards or having their laws pre-empted by congressional action.125 The key factor in these scenarios, according to Justice
O'Connor, was that in each, the state residents retain the ultimate
ability to 1 26decide whether their state will yield to the wishes of
Congress.

Based on these fundamental principles, the Court quickly found
that the monetary provisions of the LLRWPAA (which permitted the
sited states to impose surcharges on non-sited states to be collected by
the Secretary of Energy and later paid out as milestone incentives)
were constitutional. The surcharges were merely a permissible authorization by Congress allowing the States to burden interstate com121. U.S. CONST. art. VI. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
shall be the supreme Law of the Land..

122. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2419-21.
123. Id. at 2421-23. Justice O'Connor grounded her decision regarding the scope of
constitutional authority in the outcome of original debate among the Framers of the
Constitution between the New Jersey and Virginia Plans. Id.

124. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). This decision constitutionally
upheld a federal law, based on the spending power, seeking to withhold 5% of federal

highway funds from any state permitting persons younger than 21 years of age to
purchase or publicly possess alcoholic beverages. Id. at 205-06, 211. The only limits
placed on this application of congressional influence were that the expenditure must
be for the general welfare, the conditions imposed must be unambiguous and reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure, and the conditions imposed must not
violate any independent constitutional provision. Id. at 207-08.

125. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
126. Id.
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merce.' 27 The remittance to the Secretary of Energy was viewed as a
simple federal tax, and the use of the funds as incentives to states
meeting site development timetables was dismissed as a garden variety exercise of the spending power.12
The LLRWPAA provisions allowing gradual increases by the sited
states of the cost of disposal site access to the non-complying unsited
states, in addition to the right granted the sited states to eventually
refuse access altogether, likewise survived judicial scrutiny. The graduated financial penalty scheme was also deemed a valid congressional
decision to allow the sited states to burden interstate commerce. Furthermore, as a private activity within the scope of the Commerce
Clause, the Supreme Court found that low-level waste disposal was an
area in which Congress had provided the states with a choice: regulate low-level waste disposal consistent with federal standards as set
forth in the LLRWPAA, or individual waste producers would be subject to federal authorization for sited states to deny access to their
facilities.129 Failure to adhere to the LLRWPAA would burden individual waste producers, not the state as an entity. The final choice as
to which policy to pursue was seen to be at all times vested in the
residents of each state. The state's citizens were free to assess the
benefits of following LLRWPAA guidelines and to decide whether or
not to devote state resources to siting activities. Thus, these portions
of the LLRWPAA did not contravene state sovereignty as envisioned
by the modem interpretation of the Tenth Amendment.
However, the "take title" incentive was found to be an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power. The "choice" afforded the
states here was found to be a forced decision between two individually
impermissible avenues. Under the "take title" directive, states were
required to regulate according to federal dictates. The Court found
that this alternative, standing alone, would violate the division of authority between state and federal governments established in the Constitution. 3 ' The other option, in essence a mandatory transfer of lowlevel waste from generator to state government along with any resultant liability for damages, would similarly run afoul of the constitutional division of power.131 The Court reasoned that Congress could
not offer the states a choice between two unconstitutional ends.
The inclusion of the "take title" provision did not constitute an explicit congressional attempt to exercise its Commerce Clause or
spending powers. Rather, Congress had implicitly threatened the
states with forced submission to a federal instruction (states must take
title to the waste) should they choose not to regulate in accordance
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 2425.
Id. at 2426.
Id. at 2427.
Id. at 2428.
Id.
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with another federal mandate (states must adhere to the LLRWPAA).
Either path resulted m mandatory state enactment of a federal program. Consequently, the Supreme Court invalidated the "take title"
provision of the LLRWPAA of 1985.
The undemable conclusion reached after New York v. United States
is that if the federal government seeks to inplement an effective national program for low-level waste disposal, Congress must achieve
this end either indirectly through a threat of exercising one or more of
its Article I powers, or directly through an affirmative preemption of
the low-level waste arena under the Supremacy Clause by means of
one or more of its Article I powers. In others words, "[w]here a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it
must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its
agents. 1 32
II. THE

INADEQUACY

OF CURRENT LEGISLATION

At present, the precise aftermath and effect of the New York v
United States decision is unclear. In reality, the only constant over the
past decade has been the fact that the low-level waste situation in the
United States is nearing crisis proportions. In 1978, Congress recognized that the three existing disposal facilities would be msufficient to
safely and efficiently handle the nation's low-level waste m future
years. 3 This revelation spurred the ineffectual LLRWPA of 1980,
and later the LLRWPAA of 1985, now shorn of its critical "take title"
provision. At the outset of 1993, no additional sites had been developed and many states had fallen significantly behind LLRWPAA
deadlines. 3 4 The severity of the current situation has been well documented. Justice O'Connor has noted that "[w]e live in a world full of
low level radioactive waste."'3" Justice White has likewise observed
that "[tjhe imminence of a crisis in low-level radioactive waste management cannot be overstated."' 3 6 Well over one million cubic feet of
waste must be disposed of in the United States each year.' 37 Over the

132. Id. at 2429.
133. See Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 441-43.
134. See infra notes 147-71 and accompanying text.
135. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2414.
136. Id. at 2436 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. 1989 REPORT, supra note 4, at A-6. Total low-level waste output levels in the
United States in past years are: 1984: 2,618,685 cubic ft., 1985: 2,680,565 cubic ft.,
1986: 1,805,053 cubic ft., 1987: 1,841,637 cubic ft., 1988: 1,427,850 cubic ft., 1989:
1,625,862 cubic ft. Id. In more recent years, total annual waste figures were reported
to be: 1990: 1,143,222 cubic ft., 1991: 1,369,154 cubic ft., 1992: 1,741,484 cubic ft.
Telephone Interview with John Zawacki, Manager, Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. (Nov.
16, 1992)(Figures derived from "In-House Reports" at Chem-Nuclear Systems).
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site alone has
past twenty years the Barnwell, South Carolina
138
shouldered approximately 60-70% of this waste.
Notwithstanding, all waste generating states and regions failed to
meet the January 1, 1990 LLRWPAA deadline by which states and
compacts were required to submit either a site license application or a
certification by the state governor that the state is taking steps to
eventually achieve self-sufficiency with regard to disposal. 139 Furthermore, January 1, 1993, the date specified by the LLRWPAA of 1985
upon which the three sited states would be granted exclusionary authority and the unsited states were to be capable of handling their own
wastes, has quietly come and gone. Congress' attempt to coerce at
least some states to open new facilities by this deadline has not been
successful. 40 These conditions exist despite the general consensus

which existed in 1985 that milestones, deadlines and termination of
access had to be explicitly provided for in the LLRWPAA to avoid a
"serious disposal crisis" in 1993.4 x In short, we are nearing our second decade of dealing with a disposal crisis for which no immediate
remedy appears forthcoming.
In fact, further delay seems inevitable as Congress has already recognized the need to reassess the efficacy of the LLRWPAA in light of
the recent New York v. United States ruling. 42 The reasons for thls

pressing need are all too apparent. Earlier it was suggested that the
now-defunct "take title" provision was envisioned by the drafters of
the LLRWPAA of 1985 as the one crucial vehicle through which states
would be forced to come to grips with the waste disposal situation on
a regional basis. Without this provision, states would be tempted to
delay or ignore the politically damaging process of siting new
facilities. 143

Senator Hart rationalized the inclusion of the "take title" threat by
noting that without such a device, "a State may choose to 'manage' its
waste by telling the waste generators that they had to develop a means
of storage for their waste. Such a policy would be unacceptable from
our perspective and would leave generators with no effective re138. See 1988 STATE-BY-STATE, supra note 10, at A-8. In 1988, the Barnwell, South
Carolina disposal facility received 65.2% of the nation's low-level waste materials. Id.
See also Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 441.
139. See E. Michael Blake, LLW" The Slow March Toward New Sites, NUCLEAR
NEws, Feb. 1, 1990, at 54.
140. Richard R. Zuercher, Southeast Compact Commission Okays Some Continued
Access to Barnwell, NUCLEONICS WK., Aug. 27, 1992, at 2. ("[No state or compact
will open a new disposal facility by the deadline.
") [hereinafter Zuercher I].
141. Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 454.
142. 138 CONG. Ruc. S10,980 (daily ed. July 31, 1992) ("On June 19, 1992, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1985 known as the 'take title' provisions
were unconstitutional: Therefore, it is the sense of the Senate that the Congress
").
should reexamine the [Act].
143. See infra notes 147-71 and accompanying text.
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course."' 144 Another commentator agrees: "Without the taking title
provision providing sanctions upon a state for failing to carry out its
responsibilities, there is a substantial likelihood that the LLRWPAA
would be no more successful than its predecessor Act in establishing
new sites."' 4 5 Thus, although the Court in New York v United States
did express some hope that the LLRWPAA of 1985 could function
effectively without the "take title" provision,4 , legislative history suggested that the Supreme Court has in fact extracted the "teeth" which
Congress sought to provide the LLRWPAA of 1985. Therefore, in
order to determine which path should be chosen as we stand at the
crossroads created by the New York v. United States decision, we must
first seek to understand the fundamental shortcomings of the
LLRWPAA of 1985. Based on these flaws, we will identify important
goals to be achieved through revision of the LLRWPAA.
A.

The PoliticalQuagmire

One response to our inquiry can by summarized as what some commentators have dubbed the NIMBY,147 or "Not In My Backyard"
phenomenon. Simply stated, the acronym refers to the public fear and
isconception regarding low-level waste disposal aroused within state
citizens, who tend to vigorously oppose the siting of any waste disposal sites in their area. 48 As Justice O'Connor notes, "[m]ost citizens
recognize the need for radioactive waste disposal sites, but few want
sites near their homes."1 49 The natural consequence of the NIMBY
syndrome is a dilatory effect created by political squabbles. Consequently, even those states attempting to comply with the LLRWPAA
are confronted with the opposition and gridlock attendant to any
144. 131

CONG.

Ruc. 38,405 (1985) (statement of Sen. Hart).

145. Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 460.
146. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2434 (suggesting that the "take title" provision
could be severed from the remainder of the 1985 Act while still serving the congressional objective of encouraging the states to achieve self-sufficiency in the disposal of
low-level radioactive waste).
147. E.g., E. William Colglazier & Mary R. English, Low-Level Radioactive Waste:
Can New DisposalSites be Found?, 53 TENN. L. REv 621, 633 (1986); Carol M. Rose,
Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategiesfor Common Resources,
1991 Dun L.J. 1, 33 n.91; Alissa J. Stem, Controlof Toxic Substances: A Proposalto
Improve CorporateCompliance with RCRA, 22 ENVTL. L. 539, 551 (1992).

148. Several commentators have dealt with the issue of squaring siting needs with

the opposition of affected local residents. See Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey,
Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The MassachusettsApproach, 6 HARV ENvTL. L. Rnv 265, 304 (1982) (advocating compensation of communities as opposed to state preemption of siting activities). See also Charles Davis,
Approaches to the Regulation of Hazardous Wastes, 18 ENVrrL. L. 505, 517-18 (1988)
(voicing the need for heightened efforts to educate the public with respect to siting

activities).
149. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2432.
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"political hot potato.' ° The LLRWPAA, which left the details of
forming compacts and siting new facilities to the states individually,
has certainly proved highly susceptible to this sort of setback and delay. Clearly then, "[m]any states have slowed their LLW siting efforts,
while some have challenged the 1985 law in court, mainly because nuclear waste is politically unpopular.' 15 ' Faced with a choice between
compliance with the LLRWPAA and protecting career goals, many
state politicians opt for the latter course. Now that states have been
relieved of the only real threat advanced by the Act, the siting stalemate appears destined to continue and intensify.
It should be noted, however, that the foregoing analysis should not
be construed as suggesting that the New York decision was flawed, or
that the country would have an effective solution to the low-level
waste disposal crisis but for the Supreme Court's intervention. Indeed, political developments prior to the invalidation of the "take title" provision confirm that the LLRWPAA of 1985 as enacted may
have been doomed to failure at the start. In 1991, the three sited
states warned Massachusetts and New Jersey that their progress towards complying with the LLRWPAA was insufficient and threatened
to bar the two states from the use of their facilities.'5 2 Massachusetts
attributed its foot-dragging to political difficulties in the form of "inaction by the state legislature to approve bonds to finance site identification and characterization."' 1' 3 In 1990, New York experienced
obstacles in the form of state lawmakers who sought "to derail the
siting process."'1 54 Many other states, including Illinois, have faced
similar problems. 55 Indeed, Justice White's concurrence in New York
took great pains to note the political turmoil which has stemmed from
the siting process under the LLRWPA and its 1985 amendments. 6
By mid-1992, the Barnwell site had already warned that it might
also deny access to New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Michigan and the
District of Columbia unless these states could demonstrate "significant progress" toward providing for the disposal of their own lowlevel waste. 57 In fact, Michigan generators were recently denied access to the Barnwell site due to their almost total failure to comply
150. Court Says Licensees Must Find Nuclear Waste Disposal Site, A.C.R. BuLL.,

Nov. 1992, at 3.

151. Richard R. Zuercher, Decision Near on Whether States Will Lose Access to

LLW Facilities,NucLEomcs WK., Jan. 24, 1991, at 4 [hereinafter Zuercher II].
152. Richard R. Zuercher, Massachusetts,N.J. Governors Told LLW Siting Progress
Insufficien4 NuCLEONIcS WK., Jan. 31, 1991, at 4 [hereinafter Zuercher III].
153. Id.
154. Id. at 5.
155. See Blake, supra note 139, at 55.
156. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2437 (White, J., concumng m part and dissenting m
part) (detailing the "political squabbling" which has exemplified the history of the

LLRWPA and the LLRWPAA).
157. See Zuercher I, supra note 140, at 3.
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with the dictates of the LLRWPAA of 1985.158 Officials complained
that the state had attempted to avoid responsibilities under the
LLRWPAA by passing legislation imposing siting requirements so
stringent as to disqualify any region in Michigan as a potential facility.159 Nevertheless, South Carolina eventually capitulated by developing a plan to temporarily continue access for the remaining states
until mid-1994. 60 However, South Carolina felt that progress was
slow enough to emphasize that "[u]nder no circumstances should
states and compacts who are allowed continued access interpret the
extension of operations at Barnwell as a signal that they no longer
' 61
need to pursue site development in their own states and regions.'
The state's resentful stance indicates that South Carolina may soon
reconsider the exercise of its right to exclude waste from generators
outside the Southeast Compact (of which South Carolina is the current host state). Thus, we can already see cracks in the LLRWPAA
scheme whereby the over-burdened sited states have failed to realize
the exclusionary power promised by Congress in 1985.162 Current estimates suggest that the United States may163not see the opening of a
new disposal site until 1998 at the earliest.
Western states have experienced similar difficulties. Nebraska,
once a clear leader in the race to site a new disposal facility, now
doubts its ability to open a site by 1996.' 4 Environmental activists
and Boyd County (the Nebraska county in which the proposed site is
to be located) Monitoring Committee representatives have forced reconsideration of many siting issues once deemed resolved. 65 The latter organization was able to "frustrate the [siting] process"1 66 by hiring
experts with an anti-nuclear slant. 67 The plans for the Boyd County
site were thereby concisely described as having "fallen victim to poli158. Richard R. Zuercher, States Must Show Siting Progressor Risk LLW Facilities
Cut-Off NUCLEONICS WK., July 16, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Zuercher IV].
159. Richard R. Zuercher, New York, Massachusetts Expect Challenge by LLW

Sited States, NUCLEONICS

WK.,

Aug. 23, 1990, at 9 [hereinafter Zuercher V].

160. Zuercher I, supra note 140, at 2.

161. Id. (quoting Carlisle Roberts, a Southeast Compact Commissioner from South
Carolina).
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(a)(3)(B).
163. P.J. Skerret, Low-Level Waste, High Level Problem, M.I.T

TECH. REv.,

Aug.

1991, at 9.
164. Richard R. Zuercher, Nebraska Officials Going Back to Beginning to Slow
LLW Site Process, NUCLEONICS WK., May 21, 1992, at 8 [hereinafter Zuercher VI].
165. Id. at 9. U.S. Ecology is the private firm which received the contract for the
Nebraska site. U.S. Ecology's vice-president for the project, James Neal, has noted:
"What you have today are opponents who were not involved [in the siting process] at
[the outset] and were not aware of issues the commissioners had to deal with[.] They
are [now] walking through the same arguments on the same issues the commission
did." Id. at 8-9.
166. Id. at 10.
167 Id. Eugene Crump, executive director of Nebraska's Central Interstate Compact, blamed Marvin Resmckoff's consulting group, Radioactive Waste Management
Associates, for the bulk of the delays in the siting process within that compact. Id.
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tics."' 68 In addition, El Paso County m Texas has spent over $1.5 million m attorney's fees m order to resist the state's siting effort. 69
Neighboring Hudspeth County also plans to initiate a legal battle. 70
California's siting efforts, once exemplary, have also been stymied by
political upheaval. 7 '
The lesson to be drawn from the history of the LLRWPA and the
LLRWPAA is that a program which assigns responsibility for creating
additional disposal capacity to the states alone is destined for a slow,
painful political failure. Therefore, one of the primary goals of revision of the LLRWPAA is to devise a plan which substantially removes
the details of siting and compact formation from the dominion of the
individual states.
B. Additional Problems and Concerns
Viewed m the proper context, political difficulties are perhaps the
most benign consequences of the failing LLRWPAA of 1985. The inadequate performance of the legislation has produced other serious
side-effects which threaten economic, scientific, environmental and
health-related advancement in the Umted States.
1. Undue Burdens on Beneficial Processes
Perhaps the single most detrimental product of an ineffective waste
disposal program is the unnecessary threat posed to many of the nation's most critical industries. Low-level radioactive waste is the unfortunate by-product of processes which contribute substantially to
the United States' leading international status in industrial, medical
and technological fields. If disposal is handled properly, the benefits
of low-level waste production literally eclipse the relatively minor impact of the drawbacks associated with the material.
Low-level waste comes from hospitals, research labs, medical
schools and other medical institutions.' 72 The medical and scientific
advances, education and training flowing from the use of radioactive
168. Id. at 11. Republican Governor Kay Orr of Nebraska was forced to abandon
campaign plans in Boyd County after receiving a death threat over the proposed disposal facility. Many believe that Orr lost her bid for re-election as the result of her
support for the site. Mary Benanti, Atomic Age Fallout: How And Where To Bury It,
GAN=m'T Nnws SERVICE, Nov. 25, 1990, at 15, availablein LEXIS, Envirn & Energy
Libranes [hereinafter Atomic Age Fallout].
169. Blake, supra note 139, at 55. Siting progress m Texas has been hindered by the
state's legislature. The Texas Low-Level Waste Authority is techmcally supposed to
have unilateral authority over siting decisions within the state. However, the Texas
legislature effectively barred the Authority from investigating the prospects of siting a
facility in the southern portion of the state, thereby focusing the Authority's search
for a suitable disposal site in western Texas. These developments led to the current
opposition by El Paso County officials. Ia
170. Id.
171. See Zuercher VI, supra note 164, at 8.
172. See supra note 14.
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material is a small price to pay for the waste produced. In addition,
innumerable industries which produce goods ranging from luminous
watch dials to smoke alarms must rely on effective low-level waste
disposal. 173 These industries create jobs and manufacture products essential for a productive society. Furthermore, low-level waste is also
derived from full-scale nuclear power plants. 174 Nuclear power is a
relatively new and growing energy source which has already assumed
an important role in our society. 7 5 New cost and energy-efficient uses
are still being developed in the nuclear field. In light of the critical
nature of these low-level waste producing processes, it becomes clear
why an ineffective disposal program is so intolerable. As the crisis
grows, medical, industrial and energy-producing institutions are
forced to address the question of where to store the waste they produce. In many cases the waste generator may resign itself to the least
desirable solution: cut production, reduce medical treatments, curb
research. Productivity and efficiency demand that ancillary concerns
such as capacity for waste disposal be swiftly removed from the consideration of those entities whose time and money is better spent on
other pursuits.
Indeed, these concerns are quite real and have existed for years. In
1981, Senator Hart wrote of the likely effects of the ongoing disposal
capacity shortage:
The closings and restnctions upon use of the commercial burial sites
raised the possibility that the critical shortage in disposal capacity
would force many waste generators to stop or curtail their activities.
There was particular concern, for example, that hospitals and other

medical institutions with linuted capacity for on-site waste storage
would have to restrict their use of nuclear
materials for diagnostic,
1 76
therapeutic, and research purposes.
Senator Hart's fears have been repeatedly echoed over the years as
the courts, legislators and waste producers have demanded more effective policies. The LLRWPAA and its predecessor were both
grounded in a fear that a disposal crisis would spell a "halt to many
beneficial uses of nuclear materials."'1 77 Most recently, Justice White
posited that the practical effect of a low-level waste disposal site
shortage would be that "many economically and socially-beneficial
producers of such waste in the State[s] would have to cease their operations."'17 Therefore, any revision of our current program certainly
173. See, e.g., New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2414.
174. See SPENT FUEL, supra note 14.

175. See 1988

STATE-BY-STATE,

supra note 10, at C-4. As of 1988, 75 commercial

nuclear power reactors were active m the United States, dispersed among 33 states.
Id.
176. Hart & Glaser, supra note 56, at 777.
177. Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 437-38.
178. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2440 (White, J., concurring m part and dissenting m

part).
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must serve to provide adequate long-term disposal capacity for the
future so as to promote the efficient and uninterrupted functioning of
the Nation's most valuable industries. The new solution cannot offer
a mere "band-aid," a ten or twenty year reprieve from the costly distractions created by low-level waste disposal concerns. Far-sighted
policies can and must be devised to prevent a recurrence179of the lowlevel waste disposal situation over the decades to come.
2. Massive Fines & Surcharges
The problems created by weak disposal legislation reach beyond the
breakdown in the efficiency of our productive institutions. As states
have increasingly engaged in a political tug-o-war over the siting process, waste generators have been consistently burdened with the staggering penalty stipends and rate increases authorized by the
LLRWPAA.'8 0 In July of 1992, low-level waste generators outside of
South Carolina's Southeast Compact saw their disposal fees skyrocket
In addition, South Carolina's recent decito $163 per cubic foot.'
sion to extend waste generators in unsited states access beyond the
1993 LLRWPAA deadline entails an additional $25 per cubic foot in179. It can be argued that the current low-level waste disposal situation has been
exaggerated. Total annual volumes of waste production have generally declined
steadily since the nmd-1980's. See supra note 137. As a result, one might conclude
that the need for long-term future disposal capacity is less than urgent. However,
several factors suggest that the current trend toward declining annual waste outputs
may reverse itself in the foreseeable future.
Most of the nuclear power plants currently operational m the United States were

built during approximately the same time period. When the useful life of a reactor is
exhausted, the plant undergoes a process known as "decommissioning." At some
time during the next century, many domestic power plants will begin decommissionmg en masse. Telephone interview with Frank Roberts, supra note 23. Such activity
will "add dramatically to the amount of [low-level waste] to be disposed of." Hiruo I,
supra note 55, at 8. In fact, the decommssiomng of an average nuclear reactor is

expected to produce approximately 500,000 cubic feet of low-level waste. RoNNiE D.
Lnpscirrz, RADIOACTIVE

WASTES:

POLrTCS, TECHNOLOGY, AND RISK

52 (1980).

Furthermore, the financially-burdensome surcharges and penalty fees imposed by
the LLRWPAA created an economic incentive, which was non-existent when disposal
costs were low, for waste generators to engage in volume-reduction techmques mcludmg supercompaction, incineration and decontamination. Elaine Hiruo, Drop in LLW
Volume Prompts Call for 'Supercompacts'; New Designs, NUCLEONICS WK., Mar. 8,
1990, at 4 [hereinafter Hiruo I]. However, as states slowly attain self-sufficiency,
these additional fees will eventually disappear and disposal costs will fall. Moreover,
Congress' intended reevaluation of the LLRWPAA, see supra note 140 and accompanying text, may lead to a disposal program which removes surcharge and penalty fees
and reduces costs to private waste producers through more efficient compact arrangements. In either event, the current costly volume reducing practices will likely once
again become economically unsound. Consequently, generators will be persuaded to
abandon these methods.
Finally, total annual waste-volume figures for the past three years have evidenced a
notable upward trend in waste-production. See supra note 137. Therefore, it would
be unwise to dismiss the need for substantial disposal capacity in the years to come.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1)(A)-(C).
181. Zuercher IV, supra note 158, at 1.
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crease m disposal fees. 18 Further increases are planned for 1993.183
In February of 1993, generators spent $225 per cubic foot to dispose of
their waste at the Barnwell, South Carolina facility. The fee,
surcharge and penalty assessment tally is enormous. New York generators predicted approximately $10 million in penalty fees for 1992.11
These crippling expenses are being imposed on Umted States factones, laboratories, power plants, hospitals and research institutions.
They are financial burdens contributing to lower wages as well as increased costs to the medical student, the hospital patient and the average consumer. Thus, we have further identified the need for waste
disposal legislation reform which provides financial relief to low-level
waste generating industries which are forced to absorb escalating operating costs as individual states attempt to untangle a complex political knot.
3.

The Environmental & Health Consequences

High disposal costs and low disposal capacity are conditions which
jeopardize human health and seriously threaten environmental protection efforts. A state which fails to meet its obligations under the
LLRWPAA subjects its waste generators not only to costly fines and
surcharges, but also to the perplexing question of where to store their
accumulated waste. Although federal statutes do provide an avenue
of relief for these "abandoned" waste producers, this process cannot
be invoked until "an immediate and serious threat to the public health
and safety"1 85 is deemed to exist. Furthermore, the emergency relief
process is time-consuming and expensive for the generator.18 6 In the
final analysis, waste disposal legislation must be aimed at alleviating
dangers to the environment and the surrounding populace posed by
low-level waste before a crisis situation exists. Therefore, another
glaring shortcoming of the LLRWPAA is that it authorizes heavy fines
and surcharges and provides for access denial to unsited states in an
attempt to ensure compliance, but fails to establish an effective mechanism through which environmental crisis can be avoided should the
Act's other incentives fail. These incentives have failed, and there are
two alternatives, undesirable from other environmental and health
standpoints, which financially over-burdened corporations and medical facilities have been shown to resort to in order to secure recourse
from the current disposal capacity shortage.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Zuercher V, supra note 159, at 9.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2021f(a).
186. The emergency access procedure under the LLRWPAA begins with a formal
request for action by a state or waste generator. 42 U.S.C. § 2021f(b). The request
must include any information and certifications required by the NRC. Id. The NRC
then has 45 days in which to render a final decision regarding access. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2021f(c).
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The first and most detrimental option is illegal dumping. A surreptitious violation of our environmental status may eventually appear to
be a wisely calculated risk to waste generators faced with rising disposal fees and an ongoing disposal capacity shortage. David Eds, an Illinois nuclear safety official, recently summarized the incentives created
by the current crisis situation quite succinctly, noting that waste producers "are going to be caught in the middle. What'll [sic] happen
then is it [the waste] will go down the sewer. When they can't get rid
of waste legally, they'll get rid of it illegally."'187 Massachusetts Institute of Technology expert Francis X. Masse has also expressed fears
that high disposal costs coupled with an ongoing failure to deal with
excluded and "orphan" low-level waste may lead to illegal dumping.1 88 Recent events indicate that these fears are not unfounded.

In 1992, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discovered a
massive area on the Massachusetts coastline which was filled in part
with illegally dumped low-level radioactive waste including glass contamers, surgical tubing, contaminated clothing, gloves and lab equipment.189 The approximately two-mile circle of waste was dubbed "an
enormous amount"'190 and researchers found that many containers

had broken open, dispersing their contents into the marine food
chain.' 9 1 Unfortunately, the area was known to be a rich fishing spot

and a favorite feeding ground for humpback whales."9 Fishermen reported several incidents of hauling in rusted disposal containers, leadmg one official to observe that "[i]f anyone is in danger, it's the
fishermen who are pulling up some of this stuff."' 193

In the summer of 1990, a wrecking crew in Philadelphia discovered
low-level waste in an abandoned building.194 In 1985, low-level medical waste was found in a New Jersey field.' 95 The risks of illegal
dumping are amplified by the difficulty in monitoring the activities of
low-level waste generators. Although the NRC holds a fairly comprehensive list of the names of such generators, more than 20,000 licenses
have been issued for the handling of low-level waste, but only about
2,100 licensees reported delivering waste to one of three existing lowlevel waste disposal sites in 1990.196
187. Atomic Age Fallout,supra note 168.
188. Skerret, supra note 163, at 11.

189. Dianne Dumanoski & Jeff McLaughlin, Probe of Ocean Waste Site Urged,
Aug. 17, 1991, at 25.
190. David Chandler, Tales of Toxic Dumping: Panel is Told Not All Waste in
Known Area, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 1991, at 21.
191. Dumanoski & McLaughlin, supra note 189, at 25.
192. Id. at 26.
193. Chandler, supra note 190, at 22.
194. Atomic Age Fallout,supra note 168.
BOSTON GLOBE,

195. Id.
196. Id.
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Another alternative is on-site storage. Although legal, this process
is widely considered a less-than-optimal solution, even as a palliative
measure, to the low-level waste disposal crisis. On-site storage simply
refers to the practice whereby waste generators including hospitals,
universities, factories and power plants store backed-up waste on their
operating premises.. On-site storage has become a popular last-ditch
effort in several states where the disposal situation has become particularly urgent. 197 However, experts insist that on-site storage greatly
augments the risk of accident and unnecessarily subjects workers to
the threat of radioactive exposure. 98 It must be remembered that
generators are not in the business of waste storage and disposal, and
many are unlikely to possess staff members with the technical knowledge and expertise necessary to handle the extended storage of their
radioactive backload. Furthermore, most factories, hospitals and universities were not built with units designed for the storage of nuclear
matenal. 99
Concerns regarding on-site storage remain valid (albeit for different
reasons) even in the context of nuclear power plants. Technical considerations demand that all nuclear reactors be located m an area
proximate to waste, e.g., Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania. Given
this reality, a representative from the Barnwell, South Carolina disposal site has noted that on-site retention of low-level waste in these
plants means that material will be stored extremely close to the one
agent which is most conducive to radioactive migration and
seepage.20 0
The preceding analysis clearly demonstrates that the failure of the
LLRWPAA has intensified the already interminable disposal capacity
shortage and created a financially intolerable situation for the nation's
low-level waste producers. These conditions in turn have translated
into practices deleterious to both man and ecosystem. Therefore, if
we agree (and we must) that the paramount objective of our low-level
197. Skerrett, supra note 163, at 11.
198. Id.
199. Chandler, supra note 190, at 23. See also Atomic Age Fallout,supra note 168

("Without approved sites, companies, hospitals, power utilities, umversities and government agencies have nowhere to take waste or store it safely. Tis could threaten
nearby residential areas because their buildings 'are not constructed . for storing
low-level radioactive waste,' said Mark Thomas, counsel for the New York Hospital

Association.").
The unsuitability of many labs, factories, and umversities for low-level waste storage creates an additional potential source of expense for private generators. The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology has coped with the disposal crisis by storing the
radioactive material in a building on its Cambridge campus. Skerrett, supra note 163,
at 11. However, the school has questioned its ability to handle a prolonged period of

on-site storage. Therefore, MIT plans to incur expenses for the expansion of this

structure. Id. The prospect of future undertakings of this kind further serves to underline the undesirability of converting our nation's hospitals and umversities into

"inim-sites"

200. Telephone Interview with Frank Roberts, supra note 23.
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waste disposal program should be to facilitate the safe and rapid amelioration of hazardous situations which threaten both human health
and environmental stability, we have pinpointed yet another goal for
legislative reform.
III. POLICIES, PROPOSALS AND PROBLEMS: EXPLORING A NEW
DIRETION IN LoW-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL LEGISLATION

As we have seen, the events of the past two decades emphasize the
need for a re-evaluation of our nation's low-level waste management
program. Congressional deferral to the states m 1979 through the
LLRWPA of 1980 has spurred a legacy of political inaction which has
in turn created a variety of conditions which have threatened efficiency, productivity, human health and environmental stability. The
states have failed, both individually and collectively, to take advantage
of the window of opportunity provided by Congress over ten years
ago.?01 Congress must now seek to circumvent the tedious state-bystate approach to low-level waste disposal management embodied m
the LLRWPAA. Clearly, the time has come for a politically tenable
federal solution to the low-level waste disposal crisis which effectively
addresses the critical problems and concerns outlined above. However, before some concrete proposals are discussed, two general but
important goals which must serve as guideposts during the process of
legislative revision will be evaluated.
Two General Goals
An imtial consideration in deciding how to group states within a
disposal compact is their geographic proximity to one another. It
must first be recognized that the further a waste generator must travel
to dispose of its waste, the greater the financial costs it will recur. Extended distances translate into longer and more time-consuming trips,
and hence higher shipping fees. Furthermore, although low-level
waste poses less of a danger to human health than materials of higher
radioactive content, it does m fact present a hazard to the general
population if handled improperly.2°2 In this context, longer distances
between generator and disposal site create not only higher shipping
costs, but also greater opportunity for accident and inadvertent expoA.

201. See Atomic Age Fallout,supra note 168 ("A decade ago Congress, prodded by
the states, told governors to find a resting place for low-level waste. Now nearly everybody agrees that decision is [sic] a disaster - expensive, unnecessary and
dangerous.").
202. Recent evaluations of the effects of radiation exposure are cause for concern.
Although scientists once disnssed the impact of small levels of radioactivity on
human health as negligible, "[n]ow some say there is no safe threshold dose and that
repeated exposures to low levels of radiation may cause cancer." Atomic Age Fallout,

supra note 168. Furthermore, rn 1989, the National Research Council warned that
"[t]he risk of developing cancer following exposure to low levels of x-rays and gamma

rays may be three to four times higher than previously estimated." I&
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sure to radioactive materials. 0 3 Therefore, the desirability of compacts comprised of states which are grouped relatively close together
is readily apparent.
Additionally, although technology has developed methods of waste
disposal which are astoundingly effective, low-level waste invariably

creates very real environmental and health concerns. The conventional wisdom in the low-level waste disposal field reveals that states

which produce high levels of waste should bear the brunt of the disposal burden, while states producing smaller quantities should be largely
relieved of responsibility
The problems involved in determining both geographic siting and
allocation of responsibility for low-level waste need to be addressed in
an effective disposal system.
1. Geographic Proximty
While the specifics regarding the geographic aspect of compact

composition should the LLRWPAA remain intact will be assessed in
the sections which follow, our present discussion will be enlightened
by the current and long-existing situation under the LLRWPAA in
which three sited states are forced to handle all the commercial waste
produced by the remaining forty-seven. The Barnwell, South Carolina site is of course located on the southern East Coast and, as we

have noted, receives approximately 65% of the low-level waste gener-

ated by the states.2' The other two sites are located on or near the
West Coast.2" 5 The inevitable result is that many states must ship

their waste hundreds, even thousands of miles. As an example, generators as far west as Kansas, Oklahoma and Nebraska and as far north
as Maine deliver substantial portions of their waste material to the
Barnwell site.2 "i Likewise, states such as Delaware, Maryland, and

Pennsylvania ship great quantities of waste to the Richland site in

Washington.2 ' 7 The resulting expenses and potential hazards are self203. The Supreme Court has recognized the potential liabilities inherent in the
long-distance transportation of even non-hazardous articles of interstate commerce.
In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) the court struck
down an Iowa statute barring the use of 65-foot tandem trailer trucks on its roads.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, explained the court's reasoning quite succinctly: "Other things being equal, accidents are proportional to distance travelled.
Thus, if 65-foot doubles are as safe as 55-foot singles, Iowa's law tends to increasethe
number of accidents.
" Id. at 675 (citation omitted). Powell also recognized the
mefficiency and expense which greater travel distances engender. Id. at 674.
204. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
205. These are the Beatty, Nevada and Hanford (Richland), Washington sites.
206. See 1988 STATE-BY-STATE, supra note 10, at A-22-A-104. The states referred
to in the text sipped the following percentages of their total waste outputs to the
Barnwell site in 1988: Kansas: 76.5%, Id. at A-22. Oklahoma: 77.9%, Id at A-28.
Nebraska: 4.9%, Id- at A-26. Maine: 99.8%, Id. at A-104.
207. See id. at A-11-A-15. The states referred to in the text shipped the following
percentages of their total waste outputs to the Hanford (Richland) site in 1988: Dela-
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evident, and are caused by the lack of choice for the states among
relatively close disposal sites capable of handling the type of waste
produced by each generator.
The potential transportation hazards are not an illusory concern
voiced without precedent. Troubles first became apparent in 1979
when former Nevada governor Robert List closed the Beatty site after
packaging and shipping problems caused a fire which exposed at least
ten individuals to radiation.20 The incident proved to be the proverbial "last straw" as the site had also recently discovered a shipment of
waste from Michigan which had been leaking contaminated liquids
from the truck throughout a portion of its long journey.20 9 The Rich-

land site in Washington also closed temporarily shortly thereafter due
to similar problems.210
Unfortunately, the potential for disaster has continued unabated
into the present day. Since 1971, the Department of Energy has
chronicled approximately 1,356 mishaps involving the transportation
of low-level waste.211 The DOE estimates that radiation was released
on at least 545 of these occasions.212 More alarmingly, these mcidents
are likely to be underestimated; the government is unable to record
every blunder.213
A few recent examples will illustrate the dangers associated with
low-level waste shipment. On November 22, 1987, a truck from Tennessee, bound for the Richland site in Washington, overturned in Wy-

oming.2 14 The vehicle was carrying low-level waste in the form of

contaminated soil and equipment, and the accident was attributed to
bad weather and driver error.215 On December 16, 1991, a low-level
waste shipment from North Carolina to Vermont crashed and burned
in Springfield, Connecticut. 216 The accident represented Connecticut's 38th highway crisis involving the transportation of low-level
waste since 1976.217

Although the instances emphasize the need for strict packaging regulations, they also stress the reality of human error and the consequent dangers of long-distance waste shipment. Shorter shipping
ware: 92.1%, Id. at A-11. Maryland: 5.3%, Id. at A-13. Pennsylvama: 26.2%, I& at
A-15.
208. Hart & Glaser, supra note 56, at 775.

209. Id.
210. Id. at 776. The 1979 Hanford closing resulted after Washington Governor
Dixe Lee Ray learned that several waste shipments intended for the Hanford site
violated NRC regulations. Id.
211. TransportationMishaps,supra note 1.

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Danel P Jones, Radioactive Shipments In State Difficult to Monitor, HARTFORD CouRANr, Dec. 31, 1991, at Al.
217. Id.
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distances at a mimmum reduce the area over which leaking hazardous
wastes may spread. At the same time, shorter routes also serve to
nmmize the chance of unforeseen highway mishaps such as collisions, and reduce disposal costs for the waste generator. Therefore,
geographic proximity among the states in a disposal compact must be
viewed as an essential goal.
2. Sharing Benefits & Burdens
One commentator has posited that, "[m]uch more objectionable to
assuming responsibility for one's own garbage is having to take care of
another's." 18 While the assertion may at first appear to ring true,
further analysis reveals the flaw in this reasoning. We have already
recognized the economic and social benefits gained from the various
processes which yield low-level waste.21 9 These benefits do not remain confined within the borders of the generator's state or region.
Rather, they are enjoyed to an extent throughout the country. The
smoke alarms produced in a high waste-generating state (such as
Pennsylvama) save lives in a low waste-generating state (such as Wyoming). Medical advances achieved in hospitals and research labs of
the Northern and Southeastern states, which produce large quantities
of waste, rapidly disseminate across the country. In a national economy, the economic stability of factories in the major waste-producing
states is clearly relevant to the strength of the others; jobs and wealth
inevitably find their way across state lines.
As these benefits are enjoyed as a nation, so must the burdens be
borne. The low-level waste problem has ceased to limit its impact to a
handful of states, or even a particular region of the country. A national problem demands a genuinely national solution. The inequity
of penalizing the regions which account for the bulk of the benefits
and that have sole responsibility for the resultant ecological burdens
cannot be overstated. If we discard a "give and take" philosophy for a
"take and take" approach, we run the risk of creating a type of "ecological balkamzation 220 in which waste becomes concentrated almost
exclusively in regions which produce large quantities of low-level refuse. Whether this fear is to be realized under the LLRWPAA remains a matter of educated conjecture, as the siting process is far from
complete. However, based on the available data regarding the compacts currently approved by Congress under the LLRWPAA, the
Southeastern Uited States remains saddled with three times more
218. Berkovitz, supra note 11, at 489.
219. See supra note 172-79 and accompanying text.

220. See generally Ira S. Lefton, Note, Local Discriminationin EnvironmentalProtection Regulation, 55 N.C. L. IEv 461 (1977) (argung that the consequence of a
failure by the federal courts to invalidate state environmental protection provisions

wuch erect a discriminatory barrier against other states may be an "ecological Balkanization" of the country).
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waste than any other region.2 2' Therefore, it initially appears that the
provisions of the 1985 Act will provide little solace for South Carolina
and its Southern brethren.
Tins is not to imply that regions producing high levels of waste
should be absolved from all disposal responsibilities as recompense
for the benefits they create. Indeed, the heavy waste-producing states
retain a great deal of the favorable effects yielded by the activities. In
addition, the transportation concerns discussed earlier suggest that
large quantities of waste are often most safely and convemently disposed of in or around the producing state.' 2 Nevertheless, we cannot
overlook the unfairness and the environmental danger inherent in a
disposal policy which adheres to the notion that states which produce
large amounts of low-level waste have created a problem which they
alone are obliged to solve.
A final aspect of the burden-sharing goal emphasizes the need for
states to be willing to look past individual self-interest and commit
their collective resources to a plan which fosters the national interest
in an effective disposal system. As we shall see, the compacts formed
under the LLRWPAA are noticeably deficient in this regard.3 Absent this somewhat altrustic commitment, a disposal program which
serves the goals and rectifies the problems we have identified can
never be achieved. Thus, a new policy of benefit and burden-sharing
must guide our new direction in waste disposal legislation.
B. A Suggested Approach
We have now identified the major problems under the LLRWPAA
which demand resolution, as well as two fundamental principles which
ideally should guide the process of devising a new disposal program.
We may now proceed to discuss some specific suggestions for new and
more effective low-level waste disposal policy. It should be
remembered that the ideas which follow are not intended to constitute
a polished and comprehensive piece of legislation ripe for delivery to
Capitol Hill. Rather, the proposals are an attempt to illustrate, in as
much detail as possible, the type of approach which may prove more
capable than the LLRWPAA in alleviating the problems and serving
the goals we have discussed.
At this point, a brief re-cap of the problems and corresponding
goals we have identified under the LLRWPAA, as well as the policies
we have enunciated for legislative revision will serve as a useful template with which to evaluate the proposals which follow. The major
goals we have recognized (Part II) for the reassessment of current disposal legislation, each derived from a problem created by the
221. See infra Table 2.
222. See supra notes 203-17 and accompanying text.

223. See infra notes 243-337 and accompanying text.

138

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

LLRWPAA are: (1) to eliminate the political impotency caused by
the Act's state approach, (2) to end the drags placed on the efficiency
and productivity of critical United States industries by an ongoing
low-level waste crisis through the development of ample disposal capacity for the future, (3) to relieve the heavy financial burdens on
waste generators, and (4) to remove the environmental and health
dangers which have arisen as weak legislative emergency provisions
and continued capacity shortages have promoted illegal dumping and
on-site storage practices. Suggested legislative revision must address
these goals within the context of two important policy considerations:
(1) the geographic proximity of compact states and (2) the equitable
sharing of the benefits and burdens flowing from the productive use of
radioactive materials.
1. The Compact System
Our proposal begins with the retention of the regional approach to
low-level waste management; i.e., the compact system. The use of
compacts is an optimal solution to the disposal crisis because it can
serve to group states together in a manageable fashion which provides
sufficient disposal space for the future while retaining the benefits of
rough geographic proximity.' 4 Because groups of states are able to
allocate responsibility for waste disposal amongst themselves, the
compact system can also promote the goal of sharing the benefits and
burdens of low-level waste producing activities.
However, this brief discussion suggests an aspect of the existing
compact system which should be eliminated: the "go it alone" option.
This LLRWPAA election permits the state which generates a small
amount of waste to avoid the responsibility of a role in a national
solution to the disposal problem; benefits are accepted as burdens are
deflected. Conversely, the "go it alone" path, when exercised by the
state which produces a relatively large volume of waste, creates the
potential for a future disposal capacity shortage within that state.
Such a disruption would be antithetical to our goal of ensuring the
efficient and uninterrupted productivity of beneficial waste producers.
In addition, heavy waste-producing states may also seek to shirk disposal responsibilities by reducing the quantity of waste shipped into
the state through the "go it alone" alternative. Therefore, while the
compact system must remain intact in order for an effective disposal
program to be formulated, the "go it alone" option must cease to provide an "easy out" from the national disposal quandary.2
224. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(1) ("It is the policy of the Federal Government that
the responsibilities of the States under section 2021c of this title for the disposal of
low-level radioactive waste can be most safely and effectively managed on a regional
basis.").

225. The ability of "go it alone" states to truly "opt out" of disposal responsibilities

is currently unclear. Although the LLRWPAA does not explicitly provide these states
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a. Creating a New Compact System

The question then becomes, how should we apportion the states
within their respective compacts?22 6 The starting point is our two
broad policy goals: geographic proximity and the equitable distribution of benefits and burdens among member states. 7
In Table 1 and Figure 1, the compact apportionment process begins
by dividing the country into three distinct regions (see bold dividing
lines, Figure 1). States are then assigned to compacts within each region; two compacts per region, eight states per compact. A total of six
compacts are created. Each compact is authorized to exclude all
waste not generated by a compact member. The compacts are fixed
by law; states can neither alter their composition nor withdraw from a
prescribed alliance. The regional division serves the goal of geographic proximity by ensuring that compact states will have access to a
disposal facility located roughly in their area of the country. As Figure 1 illustrates, an attempt has also been made to actueve geographic
proximity within each region by dividing the sixteen states within each
region into two compacts comprised of relatively contiguous members. As we shall see however, other considerations temper our abilwith the authority to exclude waste from other regions, several theories have been
advanced which suggest that individual states may be able to secure this power
through constitutional means. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
Regardless of the ultimate efficacy of these constitutional means m creating exclusionary authority, the "go it alone" option undeniably hinders the goal of implementing a cohesive, national low-level waste disposal program. See infra notes 241-335 and
accompanying text. On one hand, compacting states may simply ignore "go it alone"
states due to the arrangement they have forged with other states. Such a result would
certainly provide "go it alone" states with a de facto reprieve from greater disposal
responsibilities. This is precisely the sort of result which our burden-sharing goal rejects. The hoarding of scarce disposal resources by one or more individual states dimiishes the capacity of the remaining states to efficiently provide for the
management of their waste. See infra notes 265-322 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, compacting states may take advantage of the "go it alone" states' inability
to exclude refuse from other regions, and thereby flood these states with waste. This
possibility both raises the prospect of unpredictable disposal patterns throughout the
country and threatens capacity shortages m the affected "go it alone" states. Therefore, tins alternative is equally undesirable from the standpoint of the stable and equitable disposal scheme. See infra notes 265-71 and accompanying text. If our goal is to
orgamze states into regions in a manner which provides a reliable and predictable
source of disposal capacity for each state, the "go it alone" option must be eliminated
before any progress can be made toward a tenable, national disposal policy.
226. Please note that the word "compact", for the purposes of the explanation of
the proposed federal program, will be used merely as a term of art. The suggested
"compacts" would not be agreements among states subject to congressional approval,
as a strict reading of the term entails, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, but rather congressionally-mandated groupings of states for the purposes of low-level waste disposal.
227. The remainder of our analysis makes liberal use of examples and illustrations
based on figures from the most recent year for which complete data was available at
the time of this writing - 1989. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, all percentages,
numerical quantities, etc., referred to m the text are derived from 1989 figures. For a
discussion regarding the significance of these statistics, see infra Appendix A.
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TABLE 1* SUGGESTED APPORTIONMENT OF STATES
WITHIN COMPACTS AND CORRESPONDING
ANNUAL LEVELS OF LOW-LEVEL
WASTE PRODUCTION**
COMPACT
REGION I:

MEMBER STATES

NORTHEASTERN

Pennsylvama
New York
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Maine
Rhode Island
Vermont
New Hampshire

SOUTHEASTERN

South Carolina
Virginia
North Carolina
New Jersey
Georgia
Maryland
Delaware
West Virginia

ANNUAL WASTE VOLUME
(In Cubic Feet)

129,440
96,642
56,526
49,079
15,634
1,419
172

27
348,939 Compact Total
96,710
82,834
58,482
53,360
48,697
39,985
1,367
411
377,855 Compact Total
726,794 REGION I TOTAL
28,916 Discrepancy

(NE-SE)
3.98% Discrepancy %age.
REGION 1H:
N. MID-WEST

Illinois
Ohio
Michigan
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Iowa
Indiana
North Dakota

133,306
58,866
43,113
21,954
6,881
6,056
2,150

104
272,430 Compact Total

WASTING AWAY AGAIN
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COMPACT
S. MID-WrT

MEMBER STATES
Tennessee
Alabama
Florida
Louisiana
Missouri
Mississippi
Kentucky
Arkansas

ANNUAL WASTE VOLUME
(In Cubic Feet)
118,958
49,249
35,283

21,724
18,800
10,995
10,047

8.329
273,385 Compact Total
545,815 REGION II TOTAL
955 Discrepancy
(NMW - SMW)
.175% Discrepancy %age

REGION Im***
CENTRAL WEST

WEST

Oregon
Oklahoma
Texas
Nebraska
Colorado
Kansas
New Mexico
Wyoming
California
Arizona
Washington
Utah
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
South Dakota

75,911
32,127
22,101
16,669
8,754
6,365
1,369

~~1

163,297 Compact Total
118,090
31,713
26,386

6,292
108
107
92
2
182,790 Compact Total
346,087

REGION III TOTAL
19,493 Discrepancy

(CW - W)
5.63% Discrepancy %age
*

Source:

OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT,

1989 ANNUAL REPORT ON Low-LEVEL RADIOACriVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
PROGRESS, DOE/EM-0006P (1990).
** The District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico also must be
considered in any low-level waste disposal legislative scheme. These regions are
eliminated from the present analysis for purposes of clarity and simplicity.
*** An alternative distribution in Region I would group together Ca, Nv, SDKs,
Co, Nm, Az and Utah on one hand (Compact A), and Wa, Or, Id, Mt, Wy, Ne Ok and
Tx on the other (Compact B). Although this arrangement aclueves total annual waste
volumes of 172,677 cubic feet and 173,410 cubic feet respectively with a discrepancy
between compacts of 733 cubic feet (a deviation percentage of 733 / 346,087 = .212%),
geographic considerations m view of siting realities renders this plan somewhat less
desirable than the Region Ill plan outlined m Table 1.
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ity to pursue the goal of geographic proximity. The scheme is not
perfect in this regard, but it does serve the goal to the greatest extent
possible in light of the additional factors to be discussed below. Thus,
the suggested approach to compact formation promises to reduce the
safety hazards and heavy fiscal costs associated with the long-distance
shipment of low-level waste. 228
The plan also serves the goal of equitably sharing the burdens of
low-level waste production. Table 1 demonstrates that the two compacts within each region generate roughly equal amounts of low-level
waste annually. Even within Region III, the Region exhibiting the
greatest disparity in annual waste levels between compacts, the compact with the greater burden is saddled with only 5.6% more waste
than its counterpart. Moreover, each compact within each region generally contains ugh, medium and low-quality waste generating
states.2 2 9 Thus, the disposal burden is distributed equally among the

compacts in each region, as well as the states of each compact within
each region. No state is permitted to permanently avoid disposal responsibilities. States are not able to isolate themselves from the national disposal crisis through the "go it alone" option. States
generating small quantities of waste are able to nominally comply with
the arrangement by latching onto a state producing larger levels of
waste with full knowledge that it will likely never be called upon to
shoulder any degree of disposal responsibility. 2 0 Furthermore, these
states are not afforded the option of grouping together to insulate
their substantial disposal resources from access by other states which
produce greater quantities of waste." 1 Conversely, states producing
large quantities of waste are not permitted to compact with several
states producing significantly smaller quantities of waste in order to
prevent acceptance of refuse from other large waste-generating
states.3 2 Rough waste-volume equivalence between regional compacts means that each will utilize its sizeable disposal resources at a
gradual, even and essentially equivalent rate. Most importantly, only
three states are no longer flooded with the total volume of the nation's waste. In short, the nation's potential disposal resources are
pooled together and equitably apportioned in order to eliminate se228. See supra notes 203-17 and accompanying text.
229. See supra Table 1.
230. See Prochaska, supra note 85, at 405 ("A small generator [state] will compact
with a large generator [state] when the latter has volunteered to be the host state.
").
The small generator will be able to export all of its low-level waste.
231. An example of this type of compacting behavior can be recognized in the
LLRWPAA's Rocky Mountain alliance. See supra Table 1, Rocky Mountain
Compact.
232. See Prochaska, supra note 85, at 405. Prochaska notes that heavy waste-generating states, if permitted to select the states with which they will compact, will attempt
to restnct their aggregate disposal burdens: "[A] large generator will join only with
These compacts allow the large generator to limit the amount of
small generators.
"Id.
waste accepted for disposal.
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vere regional disparities in waste disposal volumes. The burdens of
waste disposal are borne as their benefits are enjoyed nationally.
The preceding discussion alludes to another beneficial aspect of the
proposed plan. The creation of six compacts, each comprised of eight
member states, ensures that the compacts will have sufficient potential
disposal capacity for future years. The alignment therefore reduces
the likelihood of future crisis stemming from disposal capacity
shortages. Consequently, waste generators will no longer be intermittently plagued with the problem of finding adequate disposal space.
Critical industries will be free to function efficiently and productively
without the threat of needless interruption. Likewise, the ready availability of ample disposal capacity within each compact will remove the
need for dangerous on-site storage practices,2 3 and greatly reduce the
incentive to illegally dump low-level waste. s4
b. A Closer Look at the Suggested Compact Distribution
At this point it is helpful to clarify several important issues relevant
to the proposed compact scheme. First, it should be noted that geographic proximity, although an important objective, is not the sole
guiding factor to be considered when developing a regional compact
system. Indeed, other variables, such as annual waste production
levels and optimal compact size approximations, necessitate a balancing of goals. As an illustration, the suggested scheme for the westernmost region of the Umted States provides an example of how strict
geographic proximty concerns must be sacrificed to an extent in order
to give the proper attention to other considerations." 5 Given the annual waste levels of the Region III states and their respective physical
locations on the map,23 6 it is difficult to achieve a compact distribution
which displays both strict geographic continuity and virtual parity in
total waste volumes. The final apportionment as outlined in Table 1
and Figure 1 attempts to strike a balance between these goals. The
waste load assigned to the Western Compact exceeds that of the Central West Compact by only 19,493 cubic feet, or 5.6 percent. This annual discrepancy would fit neatly m a small fraction of one trench at
the standard disposal site.237 Figure 1 shows that the two Region III
compacts are also arranged in a fairly contiguous manner. However,
Oregon is of necessity set apart from the remaining Central West
Compact states in order to secure approximate equivalence in waste
volume levels between the two Region III compacts. Nevertheless,
233. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.

234. See supra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.

235. See supra Figure 1 and Table 1, Region III.
236. Id.
237 A single 90' x 750' disposal trench at the Barnwell site in South Carolina is
capable of housing approximately 800,000 cubic feet of low-level waste. Telephone
interview with Frank Roberts, supra note 23.
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the prospect of sluppmg large volumes of waste between Oregon and
Texas, for example, seems to be a less than desirable option. Notwithstanding, the Central West Compact plan depicted in Figure 1 was selected due to existing siting realities. Two states within the Compact,
Nebraska and Colorado, have already begun the siting process under
the LLRWPAA 238 and initially appear to be the most likely candidates for disposal duties under our plan. These states effectively represent a mid-point between the two most distant states in the compact
(Oregon and Texas). Viewed in tins light, the Central West Compact
scheme effectively compromises between geographic proximity and
burden-sharing goals.
Continuing, South Dakota also stands noticeably distant from the
other seven Western Compact states. Again, this was done in order to
retain approximately equal waste volumes between the two Region III
compacts, in order to accomplish our burden-sharing objective. Based
on the current situation under the LLRWPAA, it appears that the
likely host states for the Western Compact would be Washington and
Califorma. 39 Although these states are fairly far-removed from
South Dakota, Table 1 indicates that South Dakota generates an extremely small quantity of low-level waste per annum. In fact, the
available data reveals that the state may never generate enough waste
to warrant even a single annual shipment.240 We must therefore conclude that the apparent isolation of South Dakota from its fellow
Western Compact states does not present the usual hazards associated
with a lack of geographic proximity. i Meanwhile, the suggested approach does achieve the favorable result of creating approximately
equal annual waste burdens for the Region III compacts. Thus, the
proposed Western Compact also achieves an effective balance between our competing policy goals.
A final criticism of the proposed compact apportionment is that the
goal of burden-sharing is not truly served due to the variation in total
annual waste volumes among the three Regions. This observation can
be countered with our admitted need to weigh competing policy
objectives in order to formulate the most effective compact system.
Although it is conceivable that a distribution could be developed
which creates three regions of approximately equal levels of annual
waste production, such a system could not be devised without substantial disregard of the geographic proximity goal. This guideline pre238. See 1989 REPORT, supra note 4, at 7, 51.
239. Id. at 24, 49.
240. Based on 1989 figures, South Dakota generates approximately 2 cubic feet of
waste per year. See supra Table 1. It is unlikely that the state would slup such a small
quantity of waste out-of-state, given that such a minuscule annual waste volume could
be safely and efficiently handled through on-site storage.
241. See supra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
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vents us from grouping states as far removed as Pennsylvania and
Wyoming in order to achieve regional waste-volume equity.
In terms of our rationale for the burden-sharing goal, it is also true
that the considerable deviation in annual waste levels among Regions
appears to capitulate to the notion, lambasted earlier, which seeks to
hold heavy waste-generating states primarily responsible for the problem of disposal. However, our suggested compact system accepts this
philosophy only on a broad, regional basis in the interest of geographic proximity. In Part II we noted that although the benefits generated by low-level waste producing activities inevitably diffuse across
state boundaries, the state harboring the waste generator surely retains a great deal of these benefits especially in the economic context.2 42 The skewed regional division certainly permits us to tip our
hat to the somewhat-justified old rationale, but, more importantly, it
allows us to achieve geographic proximty between compact members.
In addition, the suggested distribution of compacts within each region
is clearly guided by the preferred burden-sharing concept. This point
is manifest in the Table 1 data which demonstrates virtual waste volume panty per annum between the compacts in each Region. Therefore, the proposal has identified the precise point at which our two
competing policy goals meet, thereby creating a balanced system for
compact distribution.
Comparing the Suggested Approach with the Likely LLRWPAA
Outcome
In order to fully assess the potential effectiveness of the proposed
compact system, we will now compare the plan with the compact apportionment which would result under the LLRWPAA. The current
compact alignment under 1985 Act is reflected in Table 2.
c.

35
Co
R
I-z

30

0

20

L

15,

FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE COMPARISON
0 PROPOSED COMPACT PERCENTAGES
5 LLRWPAA PERCENTAGES

25

10,

COMPACTS

242. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 2: CURRENT COMPACT ALIGNMENT UNDER THE
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985
I. STATES AFFILIATED WITH A COMPACT
MEMBER STATES
COMPACT
Delaware
APPALACHIAN
Maryland
PennsylvamaA
West Virginia
TOTAL ANNUAL WASTE PRODUCTION (In Cubic Feet):
AS PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL.
Arkansas
CENTRAL
Kansas
Louisiana
NebraskaA
Oklahoma
TOTAL ANNUAL WASTE PRODUCTION (In Cubic Feet):
AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL TOTAL.
CENTRAL MIDWEST

171,212
10.53%

85,244
5.24%

IllinoisA

Kentucky
TOTAL ANNUAL WASTE PRODUCTION (In Cubic Feet):
AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL TOTAL:
Indiana
MIDWEST
Iowa

143,353
8.82%

MichiganA

Minnesota
Missouri
Ohio
Wisconsin
TOTAL ANNUAL WASTE PRODUCTION (In Cubic Feet):
AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL TOTAL:
Connecticut ^
NORTHEAST
New Jersey"
TOTAL ANNUAL WASTE PRODUCTION (In Cubic Feet):
AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL TOTAL.
NORTHWEST

Alaska
Hawaii
Idaho
Montana
Oregon
Utah
Washington

157,820
9.71%

102,439
6.30%

n

TOTAL ANNUAL WASTE PRODUCTION (In Cubic Feet):
AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL TOTAL:

115,016
7.07%
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ColoradoA
Nevada
New Mexico
Wyoming
TOTAL ANNUAL WASTE PRODUCTION (In Cubic Feet):
AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL TOTAL.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN

10,215
.628%

Alabama

SOUTHEAST

Florida
Georgia
Mississippi
North CarolinaA
South Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia
TOTAL ANNUAL WASTE PRODUCTION (In Cubic Feet):
AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL TOTAL.
Arizona
SOUTHWESTERN
CaliformaA
North Dakota
South Dakota
TOTAL ANNUAL WASTE PRODUCTION (In Cubic Feet):
AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL TOTAL.
II. UNAFFILIATED STATES AND REGIONS
ANNUAL WASTE PROD
(In Cubic Feet)
STATE OR REGION

497,208
30.58%

149,909
9.22%

% OF NAT'L

DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA+
MAINE#
MASSACHUSETTS#
NEW HAMPSHIRE+

NEW YORK #

PUERTO RICO+
RHODE ISLAND+
TEXAS

#

925
15,634
56,526

.057%
.962%
3.48%

27

.002%

96,642

5.94%

0

0.00%

1,419

.087%

22,101

1.36%

.011%

172

VERMONT+
* Statistical Source: OFFICE

OF

ENVIRONMENTAL

AND

WASTE

RADIOACTIVE

WASTE

RESTORATION

MANAGEMENT, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT ON Low-LEVEL
MANAGEMENT PROGREss, DOE/EM-0006P (1990).
A Indicates Compact-Affiliated states planning to host site.

+ Indicates Unaffiliated states or regions with no current plans to either join a
compact or site a disposal facility.
# Indicates Unaffiliated states with current plans to site a disposal facility.
i.

Over-Abundance of Disposal Sites

Perhaps the most glaring difficulty with the LLRWPAA scheme is
that it actually provides for too many disposal facilities. At present,
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there are nine Congressionally-approved compacts in the United
States.243 Each will site one disposal facility, 2 4 except the Northeast
Compact which plans to site both of its member states.245 Thus, ten
disposal facilities are ultimately planned for construction under the
LLRWPAA. In addition, four "go it alone" states also plan to develop sites.24 Assuming that none of the five remaining uncommitted
states choose to host facilities, the LLRWPAA thus provides for a
minimum of fourteen low-level radioactive waste disposal sites .4 7 At
first glance, this scenario may appear to vigorously serve the goal of
providing adequate disposal capacity for the future.24 However,
countervailing factors militate against such an over-abundance of
sites. Francis X. Messe, the director of MIT's Radiation Protection
Program, is convinced that fourteen disposal sites are simply "too
many."'' 49 The main problem with siting an inordinate number of
states is purely economic. Disposal facilities are operated by private
firms whose primary motive, quite understandably, is profit. 25 0 A
multiplicity of compacts means fewer member states per compact and
hence less waste per compact. The widespread fear is that, under the
LLRWPAA, some facilities will fail to receive enough waste to make
the venture lucrative. 5 ' Affected states and compacts will then revisit
the current crisis situation as they are left with no available disposal
capacity. This is a quandary we explicitly resigned to avoid in Part
1
II . 52 Based on Table 2, the Rocky Mountain Compact (whose four
members generated only 10,215 cubic feet, or .628% of the nation's
waste, in 1989) and the Central Compact (whose five members generated only 85,244 cubic feet, or 5.24% of the nation's waste, in 1989)
seem particularly susceptible to economic failure. These assertions
are initially validated by recent developments involving Chem-Nuclear, the private firm which built and currently operates the Barn243. See Table 2.
244. Table 2 identifies projected initial host states for each LLRWPAA compact.

245. 1989

REPORT,

supra note 4, at 20.

246. See Table 2.
247. Table 2 reveals that the total number of sites under the LLRWPAA could rise
as high as 19 if the District of Columbia, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island,
and Vermont ultimately decide to site their own facilities.
248. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
249. Skerret, supra note 163, at 11. See also Atomic Age Fallout, supra note 168
it's tens of millions of dollars to develop a
("'This is absurd. If you talk to experts
site that is not needed - and we've got a dozen of them [planned] that are not needed,'
said Robert Bernero, the NRC's safety chef."). In fact, when Congress initially evaluated the low-level waste disposal situation, it concluded that six to eight compacts
would represent the most efficient regional distribution. See 126 CONG. REc. 20,136
(1980)(statement of Sen. Thurmond).
250. See supra note 55.
251. See, e.g., Hiruo II, supra note 179, at 4 ("The latest concern, according to Clark
Bullard of the Umversity of Illinois, is that there may be too many disposal sites
[under the LLRWPAA] to economically handle the waste.").
252. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
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well, S.C. site. In 1990, Chem-Nuclear refused to bid on a contract for
the construction and operation of the Central Compact's proposed facility. The company explained its decision, citing "its belief that the
projected waste stream was too small to be economically viable." 3
Potential sites m apparent "go it alone" states like New Hampshire,
Maine, Rhode Island and Vermont (which produce very small quantities of low-level waste per annum)25 4 likewise initially appear to be
financially untenable.- 5
Even if we entertain the highly questionable assumption that all of
the LLRWPAA compacts will produce waste volumes sufficient to
promote a bare minimum of financial feasibility, the fact remains that
the more waste-intensive the compact, the more profitable and costeffective it will prove. A study conducted by Chem-Nuclear Systems,
Inc. reveals that a disposal site handling 100,000 cubic feet of waste
per annum entails twice the operating costs of a site handling 200,000
cubic feet per year, and three times the costs of a site disposing
300,000 cubic feet annually." 6 Apply this exponential cost phenomenon to Table 2 and Figure 2. Thirteen of the fourteen proposed sites
under the LLRWPAA will receive less than 200,000 cubic feet of
waste per year. Eleven of the fourteen will receive less than 150,000
cubic feet, and six of the fourteen will handle less than 100,000 cubic
feet each year. In comparison, two of our six suggested compacts will
receive almost 400,000 cubic feet of waste annually. Two others will
receive almost 300,000 cubic feet per annum. The remaining two are
likely to receive almost 200,000 cubic feet of waste each year. Therefore, the LLRWPAA advocates a number of small and inefficient
sites. Our program is infinitely more desirable from an economic
standpoint as it employs fewer, more waste-intensive sites.

253. Hiruo II, supra note 179, at 4.
254. See Table 2.
255. See Prochaska, supra note 85, at 397. Prochaska confirms that "go it alone"
states producing small amounts of waste annually may have difficulties in operating

their sites efficiently. Id. Others note that smaller sites m terms of total waste
volumes are economically disadvantaged m relation to "larger sites that benefit from
economies of scale." Conrad, supra note 85, at 662 n.66. Indeed, Congress originally
decided on the regional approach to waste disposal because it feared that sites in
individual states would prove unprofitably small and eventually face bankruptcy. NATIONAL GOVERNORS' AssOCIATION TASK FORCE ON Low-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE DISPOSAL, Low-LEVEL WASTE: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION 6 (1980).

256. Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact"
Hearngs Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1983)
(statement of David G. Ebenhack, Vice-President, Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc.)
[hereinafter Southeast Compact Hearings]. Similarly, Clark Bullard of the Umversity
of Illinois has stated that unit disposal costs rise above $219 per cubic foot for sites

accepting less than 200,000 cubic feet of waste per annum. Hiruo II, supra note 179,
at 5. Therefore, smaller waste streams per compact threaten both decreased profitability for the private site operator and increased costs per unit for waste generators.
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Some sites may respond to financial difficulties by cutting back on
the employment of staff essential for proper site momtoring.257 In an
attempt to avert financial collapse, still other site operators will be
forced to compensate for insufficient waste flow with grossly inflated
disposal fees. 2 8 Senator Dodd has acknowledged recent studies
which estimate that under the current LLRWPAA sitmg plans, the
cost to construct each facility will range from $40-$100 million.25 9 An
additional $20 million per site will be required to cover operational
costs each year.260 Senator Dodd recognmzes that these funds will be
obtained through the disposal fees charged to waste generators. As a
result, these fees are expected to rise to a staggering level - somewhere between $400 and $700 per cubic foot.261 Compare these
figures with the cost per cubic foot of waste disposal in 1975: 80
cents.262 Furthermore, Senator Dodd notes, "you can believe that
these additional costs will be borne by the taxpayer."263 The inefficient LLRWPAA compact system thus raises the spectre of continued
financial burdens on waste generators, perpetuates the incentive to
illegally dump low-level waste and exacts a heavy financial toll on the
general public.
In contrast, Table 3 shows that none of the sites in our proposed
compacts will be forced to handle less than 10.04% (or 163,297 cubic
feet) of the nation's total annual waste volume. Figure 2 similarly
demonstrates that volume percentages for the numerous LLRWPAA
compacts will tend to remain below, sometimes drastically below, 10%
per year in order to compensate for the massive load to be handled by
the Southeast Compact. Volume percentages under our proposed
plan are moderate and more evenly apportioned within the 10-20%
range.2c4 Although percentages fluctuate fairly substantially among
our suggested compacts due to the need for geographic proximity,2 65
each region appears to receive a quantity of waste adequate to keep
257. Skerret, supra note 163, at 10.
258. See Southeast Compact Hearings, supra note 256. The correlation between
waste-stream levels and disposal fees charged to waste generators has been well documented: "While the smaller volume could be pushing disposal costs up at existing
facilities, in order to meet operating expenses, costs may be higher still at future disposal facilities." Hiruo II, supra note 179, at 6. See also Prochaska, supra note 85, at

385. ("The size of the disposal site is the most important factor m determining disposal cost and, since under the regional compact system more and smaller waste disposal

sites are being considered, prices of disposal are likely to rise even further.").
259. 137 CONG. REc. 14,562 (1991). See also Atomic Age Fallout, supra note 168
("A G[annett] N[ews] S[ervice] survey estimates the cost of planning and building the
sites [under the LLRWPAA] is upwards of $750 million. Americans will pay the price

in higher utility bills, medical bills and taxes.").
260. 137 CONG. REC. 14,562 (1991).
261. Id.
262. Prochaska, supra note 85, at 385 n.14.
263. 137 CONG. REc. 14,562 (1991).
264. See Figure 2.
265. See supra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 3: PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL ANNUAL U.S. LOWLEVEL WASTE OUTPUT TO BE RECEIVED BY
PROPOSED COMPACTS
TOTAL U.S. LOW-LEVEL WASTE PRODUCTION (1989):
1,625,862 cubic feet
ANNUAL WASTE PRODUCTION
(In Cubic Feet)

PERCENTAGE

NORTHEAST
SOUTHEAST
N. MID-WEST
S. MID-WEST

348,939

21.46%

377,855
272,430
273,385

23.24%
16.76%

CENTRAL WEST

163,297

10.04%

WEST

182,790

11.24%

COMPACT

16.82%

disposal fees low for the waste generator, and render disposal operations economically feasible for the site operator. While the economic
aspects
of the siting process will be discussed in further detail below, 266 It is presently sufficient to note that the compact system created by the LLRWPAA poses serious economic threats to the longterm stability of a cohesive disposal program.
ii.

Future Capacity

Disposal capacity is what economists call a "scarce resource. ' '267 As
we have recognized, one of our primary goals is to distribute disposal
space in such a manner as to ensure that each compact receives
enough space to accommodate their future needs.268 The LLRWPAA
compact system appears likely to miss this important target.
Some of the compacts formed under LLRWPAA consist of very few
members, but arguably generate enough waste to operate their sites
profitably. However, these small compacts face the additional prospect of running out of disposal capacity in the coming decades. 269 The
Central Midwest and Northeast Compacts, each consisting of two
member states, are most suspect in this regard.270 The Appalachian
and Southwest Compacts (four member states each) also may not be
immune to this cnticism. 27 ' Furthermore, relatively heavy waste-generating "go it alone" states like New York and Massachusetts can also
266. See infra notes

402-30 and accompanying text.

267. See RIcHARD G. LIPSEY

ET AL., ECONOMIcs

4-5 (8th ed. 1987).

268. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
269. The possibility of future disposal capacity shortage in one or more of the
LLRWPAA compacts depends on two major variables: future waste levels within the

compacts, and the total disposal capacity of the facilities actually constructed within
each compact.
270. See Table 2.

271. Id.
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be characterized as susceptible to future disposal capacity shortage.2 72
In any event, the prospect of renewed crisis simultaneously raises the
potential for a need to re-vamp the disposal system to some future
date, and hence for disrupting the activities of important industries.
Whether these fears will become reality cannot be known until many
years pass. However, it is both unnecessary and irresponsible to allow
the future of effective waste disposal to hinge on a gamble. Indeed,
the current LLRWPAA compact alignment even fails to compensate
for this risk through offsetting advantages. In comparison, our proposed plan offers valuable insurance against future crisis by providing
each utilizing the copious disposal resources of eight
for six27compacts,
3
.
states
iii. The Burden-Sharing Goal
Recall that one of the focuses of our burden-sharing goal is the equitable distribution of disposal burdens among regional compacts in
order to prevent the unfairness which results when excessive disposal
occurs m any single area of the country, potentially leading to undue
environmental dangers.274 Up through the present day, the "environmental balkanization" process has been most prevalent in South Carolina. 275 The Barnwell site, as we have recogized, has accepted an
inordinate proportion of the nation's annual waste output since its inception.276 Under the LLRWPAA, the burdens of a disproportionate
concentration of waste are shifted from South Carolina to the entire
Southeastern Umted States as a region.2 77 This condition will still exist under the 1985 Act primarily because the plan has encouraged
compact formation on the basis of state self-interest.278
When the unsited states were confronted with the legislative necessity of forming compacts, their initial response was to race for affiliation with the existing sited states 7 9 The motive of the unsited states
was simple: a large compact with an operational site minimized the
272. The "future capacity shortage" argument m the context of large waste-producing, "go it alone" states becomes increasingly convincing when viewed in light of the
fact that the LLRWPAA has declined to offer exclusionary authority to "go it alone"
states. See supra note 225. These states may find themselves subject to a deluge of
waste from other states and regions.
273. See Table 1.
274. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 138.
276. Id.
277. See Table 2.
278. See Prochaska, supra note 85, at 400-09. Prochaska undertakes a detailed explanation of the effect of individual state's self-interest on the compacting process.
The author outlines a hierarchy of state goals under the LLRWPAA, 1d. at 401 n.115,
ultimately concluding that "[t]he [LLRWPAA] do[es] not remove the instability inherent in the system, and will only delay resolution of the problem. " Id. at 400-01.
Moreover, Prochaska insists that "[t]he goals of the compact system clash with the
motivations of the individual states." Id. at 401.
279. Id. at 386; Condon, supra note 85, at 69.
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possibility that any of the unsited members would be forced to serve
as host.2" South Carolina was obviously a preferred target due to the
massive quantities of waste it had histoncally accepted. 81 The result,
quite predictably, was that the largest and most waste-saturated
LLRWPAA compact formed around the Barnwell site.'
Seven
Southeastern states were permitted to join the Compact, apparently
without proper consideration of their respective waste production
levels. 283 As the Southeast Compact materialized under the
LLRWPAA, states further to the north, which produced smaller quantities of waste, were excluded from the Compact and scrambled to
forge other alliances. 284 Table 2 shows the current LLRWPAA Southeast Compact membership, as well as its massive annual waste output
level. A perusal of Table 1 reveals the respective annual waste output
levels of the member states, illustrating that each of the Compact's
eight affiliates is a relatively heavy waste producer. The consequences
of compact formation based on state self-interest under the
LLRWPAA are clear. Seven of the nine approved compacts are responsible for less than 10% of the nation's total annual waste production. 285 Who picks up the slack? Primarily the Southeast Compact,
which will be 2responsible
for the disposal of over 30% of total annual
86
waste output.
However, the unsited Southeast Compact states have failed to realize their expectations of a "free ride" under the 1985 Act. South Carolina has complained for years about its long-standing role as the
nation's dumping ground. 87 The state has vowed to close the Barnwell site as soon as LLRWPAA milestones are fulfilled. 88 Although
280. See Prochaska, supra note 85, at 402 ("Compacts headed by states with operating disposal sites were quickly joined by states that saw an opportunity to ship their
own waste to another state.").
281. See supra note 138.
282. Table 2, Southeast Compact.
283. Id.
284. Prochaska, supra note 85, at 386-87.

285. See Table 2.
286. Id.
287 South Carolina's dissatisfaction with its inequitable role m the low-level waste
disposal system was first evidenced m 1979 when Governor Riley decreed that the
state would temporarily cut the level of waste it accepted for disposal by one half.

H.R. REP. No. 314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 17-18 (1985). Senator Strom Thurmond has echoed the state's perception of the inherent inequity m its undue disposal
responsibilities: "It is extremely unfair to allow three states to become the 'dumping

grounds' for waste which all 50 states generate." 126 CONG. REc. 20,136 (1980).
288. See 1989 REPORT, supra note 4, at vi. It is unclear as to when the Barnwell site
will completely cease operations. The date has been revised at least once, see A. at 82
(demonstrating that in 1989, the North Carolina facility was predicted to open on

January 1, 1993; as of March, 1993, the site still had not opened), and much of the
uncertainty is contingent upon North Carolina's progress toward siting the Southeast
Compact's next facility. However, Barnwell will most assuredly be closed to out-ofcompact waste generators on June 30, 1994. Zuercher IV, supra note 158, at 1. It
seems likely, then, that the North Carolina site will begin operations, and hence the
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South Carolina officials won't be holding their breath, North Carolina
has been selected as the Southeast Compact's next host state.2s 9 In
fact, the Compact's charter provides that each member must take its
turn as host.2 90 Therefore, the original incentives motivating currently
unsited Southeast Compact member states have been displaced. What
remains after the "backfire" is a large compact comprised of eight
states, each a massive waste producer. The self-interest of the unsited
Southeast Compact member states has ultimately served only to saddle the region with three times the annual waste volume of any other
LLRWPAA compact. 291 Clearly then, the problem of excessive waste
disposal has been reluctantly shifted from the solitary concern of the
Palmetto State to the concern of the entire Southeastern United
States. We need not restate the mequitable and self-evident ecological dangers inherent in allowmg an undue proportion of waste to accumulate in this region.29 Therefore, by blindly deferrmng to the selfinterested motives of the unsited states through Congressional approval, the LLRWPAA has implicitly ratified the "environmental balkanization" process in the Southeast.
Although the LLRWPAA plan provides South Carolina with a welldeserved reprieve from disposal responsibilities, 293 the Act achieves
this favorable result by isolating a substantial portion of the nation's
waste within the Southeast region.2 94 It is futile to argue that the
LLRWPAA's Southeast Compact possesses substantial disposal capacity and sufficient member states to cushion the impact of the large
waste volumes the Compact is obliged to handle. This observation
ignores considerations of fundamental fairness, turns a deaf ear to environmental concerns and is unlikely to bode well with the citizens of
the Southeastern states, who will inevitably wonder why the other
states aren't doing much "cushionmng. '' 295 In our system, the burdensharing factor replaces the dominant role assumed by state self-interest under the LLRWPAA's misguided approach. Limited only by the
concerns of geographic proxinty, our compact system serves to
equalize waste disposal responsibilities among regions to the greatest
South Carolina site will close, somewhere between June 30, 1994 (final date for outof-region access to Barnwell, id.) and January 1, 1996 (final LLRWPAA deadline for
the operation of all new disposal facilities, 42 U.S.C. § 2021e).
289. 1989 REPORT, supra note 4, at 54.
290. 135 CONG. Rnc. S15,399 (daily ed. November 9, 1989).
291. See Table 2. The Southeast Compact is obliged to handle approximately
30.58% of the nation's low-level waste under the LLRWPAA. The LLRWPAA compact saddled with the next-ighest annual waste burden is the Appalachian Compact,
which will be responsible for only 10.53% of the nation's waste. Id.
292. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
293. While South Carolina currently receives approximately 65% of the nation's
waste each year, see supra note 138, the Southeast Compact will receive about 30.58%
under the LLRWPAA. See Table 2.
294. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 274-86 and accompanying text.
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extent possible. 296 Burden-sharing is realized by dividing the
LLRWPAA's Southeast Compact states into two factions: Georgia,
North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia on one hand, and Alabama, Florida, Mississippi and Tennessee on the other.2 97 The wasteload handled by the former faction is spread northward to Delaware,
Maryland, New Jersey and West Virginia.2 98 Our Southeastern Compact, if adopted, would place the heavy waste-producing states of the
first faction in a compact which handles approximately 25% less waste
than the LLRWPAA's Southeast Compact. 299 Responsibility for the
disposal of this excess waste is distributed among other compacts
which would otherwise unduly profit from the LLRWPAA's skewed
arrangement. The annual waste volume produced by the latter faction
is likewise spread among states to the north and west including Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Missouri. 300 This group constitutes
our Southern Midwest Compact, a distribution scheme which eases
the burden on the states of the second faction by placing them in a
compact responsible for handling roughly 45% less waste per annum
than the LLRWPAA's Southeast Compact.30 ' While geographic proxunity considerations .prevent a total remedy for the "environmental
balkanization" malady in the Southeast, 3°2 our alignment certainly
would prove more successful in attaining the goal of burden-sharing
through regional equity. No longer is one regional compact forced to
absorb a disproportionate percentage of low-level waste while the remaining groups shirk disposal responsibilities.
It should be realized that the beneficial outcome under our compact
system is more the product of a pragmatic and holistic view of the
nation's disposal problem than a calculated attempt to reduce the burden on the Southeast. When we relegate state self-interest to secondary status in the compacting process and elevate the importance of
factors truly relevant to solving the problem, the struggle to identify a
tenable solution is significantly facilitated. At the outset, then, we
would not fall into the trap of adopting a plan as inequitable and environmentally unsound as that established under the LLRWPAA.
296. See Table 1.
297 Id.
298. Id. at Southeastern Compact.
299. The LLRWPAA's Southeast Compact will generate approximately 497,208 cubic feet of waste per annum. See Table 2. Under our plan, Georgia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Virginia are assigned to the Southeastern Compact, see Table 1,
which is expected to generate roughly 377,855 cubic feet of waste each year. Id.
Therefore: 377,855 / 497,208 = =76%, 100% - 76% = =24% less waste per year.
300. See Table 1.
301. The LLRWPAA's Southeast Compact will generate approximately 497,208 cubic feet of waste per annum. See Table 2. Under our plan, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi and Tennessee are assigned to the Southern Mid-West Compact, see Table 1,
which 'is expected to generate roughly 273,385 cubic feet of waste each year. Id.
Therefore: 273,385 / 497,208 = =55%, 100% - 55% = -45% less waste per year.
302. See supra notes 274-86 and accompanying text.
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The burden-sharing objective also stresses the need for collective
state commitment to a disposal system which evenly rations disposal
resources so as to serve the national interest in alleviating the
problems and serving the goals we have identified. 30 3 Thus, renewing
our conceptualization of disposal capacity as a scarce resource, there
is a fixed supply of such capacity in the Umted States. Moreover, the
allocation of this scarce resource between compacts is a zero-sum
game; as one compact absorbs more capacity (i.e., states), the remaining compacts must necessarily receive less. The LLRWPAA compact
arrangement is a textbook illustration of this fundamental lesson.
One will note that, aside from the failure to strategically group
states in order to minimize the waste load imposed upon the Southeast states, the LLRWPAA's Southeast Compact closely resembles
that suggested by our plan.3° Indeed, the Compact would represent
an almost ideal arrangement were it not for the existence of one
damning reality. As alluded to earlier,3 5 the excessive burden
shouldered by the Southeast Compact has given the other states leave
to form a variety of small and economically inefficient compacts (e.g.,
Central Midwest and Northeast) based on self-interest. 306 These compacts, as we have seen, also threaten to disrupt the disposal process by
exhausting their future disposal resources. 307 These compacts are legislatively authorized to exempt themselves from participation in a
truly national system of waste disposal. In short, the LLRWPAA rewards the desire of the individual states to withhold disposal resources
from a broader constituency with exclusionary power.
Other compacts which do not fit this pattern represent self-serving
attempts to unite many states which produce small quantities of waste
for the purpose of excluding waste produced in states generating
higher levels. As a result, and given the reality of exclusionary authority for each compact, scarce disposal resources are squandered on
those regions which least require the capacity. One clear example is
the LLRWPAA's Midwest Compact which consists of seven states
generating a total of approximately 157,820 cubic feet of waste per
year.30 This figure is 87,972 cubic feet less per annum than the level
of waste produced by two other LLRWPAA compacts (Northeast and
Central Midwest), with a total of only four member states, combined. 0 9 Our distribution alleviates this disparity by strategically
303. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.

304. See Table 1.
305. See supra notes 274-86 and accompanying text.
306. Id.

307. See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text.
308. See Table 2.
309. The LLRWPAA's Midwest Compact, compnsed of seven member states, will
generate approximately 157,820 cubic feet of waste each year. Table 2. In the aggregate, the LLRWPAA's Northeast Compact (two member states, 102,439 cubic ft./yr.)
and Central Midwest Compact (two member states, 143,353 cubic ft./yr.) produce
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grouping northern Midwest states m order to acieve a more judicious
annual waste burden of 272,430 cubic feet.3 10
The Rocky Mountain Compact is another illustration of the inefficient use of disposal resources wich will result from LLRWPAA's
acquiescence to states forming compacts based on self-interest rather
than national interest. This compact provides exclusionary authority
for four large Western states which together generate less than one
percent of the nation's annual waste.3 1 ' The obvious purpose is to use
LLRWPAA compliance as a shield, thereby avoiding affiliation with
nearby heavy waste producing states such as California and Ore-

gon 3 12 Our suggested approach more effectively employs the disposal
capacity of these states by assigning them to compacts capable of handling over ten times the amount of waste than would be accepted by
the Rocky Mountain Compact,31 3 a level commensurate with their disposal resources.
Still other LLRWPAA compacts join one heavy waste-producing
state with several other states which each generate very little low-level
waste. In this way, the heavy waste generator avoids affiliation with
other mass producers, and need only accept a minimum amount of
additional waste from its partners.3 14 The large generator invariably
serves as the compact's original host state, but is often protected by a
"trigger" clause3 15 in the compact's charter wich imposes host liability on other states whose waste production rises above a pre-determined level.3 16 The member states which produce small amounts of
low-level waste, unable to afford the "go it alone" option, attain
LLRWPAA compliance, and thus exclusionary authority, by compactmg with the heavier waste producers. As a result, they are able to
ship all of their waste out-of-state and take only a small risk of incurroughly 245,792 cubic feet of waste each year (102,439 + 143,353). Id. Thus, the seven
members of the Midwest Compact together generate about 87,972 cubic feet less than
the four states which account for the total membership of the Northeast and Central
Midwest Compacts (245,792 - 157,820 = 87,972). Id.
310. See Table 1.
311. See Table 2.
312. Id.
313. The LLRWPAA's Rocky Mountain Compact is expected to receive roughly
10,215 cubic feet of waste each year. Id. Under our plan, LLRWPAA Rocky Mountain member states Colorado, Nevada and Wyoming are assigned to the Central West
Compact. See Table 1. The Central West Compact would be expected to handle about
163,297 cubic feet of waste per annum. Id. Therefore, under our system, these states
would find themselves in compacts responsible for over 10 times the amount of waste
to be accepted annually by the Rocky Mountain Compact (10,215 x 10 = 102,150 <
163,297). Likewise, LLRWPAA Rocky Mountain Compact member New Mexico
would be assigned to the Central West Compact under our system, which can be expected to receive =182,790 cubic feet of waste each year. Id. Thus: 10,215 x 10 =
102,150 < 182,790.
314. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
315. See infra notes 359-64 and accompanying text.
316. Prochaska, supra note 85, at 405.

WASTING AWAY AGAIN

19931

ring host status via the "trigger" provision.317 Clearly, this arrangement works to the benefit of the members involved, but to the
detriment of the disposal system as a whole. The most glaring examples of this type of LLRWPAA compact are the Appalachian and
Southwest Compacts.
Pennsylvania produces 75.6% of the four-member Appalachian
Compact's total waste.318 The Southwest Compact, also comprised of
four member states, derives 78.8% of its waste load from Califorma.3 1 9 Pursuant to state self-interest, disposal resources in these compacts are employed in a manner which minimizes the role of each
state in a national solution of the disposal crisis; states effectively insulate themselves from the risk of greater responsibility for waste disposal through these smaller compacts. Since the amount of waste the
large generator must receive from the three other small generators is
negligible as a percentage of the former's output, these schemes
amount to a "go it alone" election by the large generator which in turn
serves to absorb the disposal resources of the three other states. As a
result, the linuted supply of disposal resources cannot be allocated effectively, and larger compacts with optimal financial stability and
guaranteed future disposal capacity cannot be realized. Indeed, these
compacts must remain small because the large generator will refuse to
compact with other states which produce more substantial quantities
of waste.32 ° This type of compact, together with the other LLRWPAA
arrangements grounded m the state self-interest described above, 321
contributes to an overall system which lacks efficiency as well as the
capacity to provide a permanent solution to the national waste disposal problem. Such will be the fate of any policy which ignores the
need of equitably distributing the burdens of low-level waste
production.
Lastly, the LLRWPAA has permitted at least seven states to exercise the "go it alone" option.322 The count rises to nine when we realize that the Northeast Compact, comprised of two states each
planning to site a facility to the exclusion of all others including their
compact cohort, 323 is essentially a joint, back-door "go it alone" election. These states are able to hoard their disposal resources, hence
drastically reducing the available pool of such resources through
317.
318.
319.
320.

See id.
See Table 2.
Id.
Prochaska, supra note 85, at 405 ("Because these [large generator] states can

economically pursue the single state option, they are not pressured into joining large

or medium generators m a regional compact.").
321. See supra notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
322. See Table 2.

323. See 1989

RIPORT, supra note

4, at 20.
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which the burdens of waste disposal may be spread.324 The negative
consequences of this activity have already been detailed at length.
The most important point to be gleaned from the examples offered
above is that the LLRWPAA has produced a defective compact system which leaves much to be desired in terms of the burden-sharing
goal we have identified as necessary for an effective disposal program.
The burdens of low-level waste disposal are inequitably distributed as
individual state interests guide the site selection process, hence ratifying excessive concentration of waste in the Southeast. In addition,
states have proved unwilling to contribute their disposal capacities to
larger, more stable and more efficient compacts. The states believe
they have acted in their own best interests, but in fact they have acted
against the interests of the nation, each other and ultimately, themselves. An inordinate number of compacts have formed, the compositions of which threaten both the ability to provide long-term disposal
capacity and the financial viability of proposed sites. With these prospects comes the potential for a renewed crisis period exemplified by
high disposal fees, illegal dumping incentives and on-site storage practices. In the final analysis, a refusal to pool disposal resources and
share in the burdens of waste disposal serves no interest.
In stark contrast, our suggested approach goes a long way toward
filling the gaps left by the 1985 Act. By supplanting self-serving state
motives with a thoughtful evaluation of pragmatic considerations
grounded in the goal of burden-sharing, scarce disposal resources are
allocated prudently and efficiently. The result is a handful of large
compacts with more equivalent waste loads, the potential for financially sound disposal sites, and predictable, stable access to disposal
capacity. Under our plan, the fear of future crisis is eliminated, disposal costs are minimized, beneficial waste-producing activities can continue unimpeded, and the environmental and health related concerns
created by illegal dumping and on-site storage will disappear.
iv.

Withdrawal Provisions

All LLRWPAA-approved compacts provide members with highly
permissive withdrawal rights. These provisions were included in compact charters m order to coax rapid state ratification. 325 Thus, "[w]hile
a state wishes to ensure that host states do not withdraw from the
compact, at the same time it also wishes to ensure that it will be able
to withdraw if designated as host. ' 326 Northwest Compact members
may withdraw at will.3 27 Southeast Compact members may also with324. However, the ability of "go it alone" states to withdraw completely from responsibility for the disposal of waste generated outside their borders is currently unclear. See supra note 85.

325. Prochaska, supra note 85, at 395.

326. Id.
327. Id. at 395; see also Northwest Compact, art. VI, § 1.
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draw at any time, but a sited member must allow access to the other
seven states for a four-year period after giving notice of abandonment.3 1s The Rocky Mountain Compact requires only two years advance notice for a withdrawal of unsited members, and a five-year
access window must be afforded by sited party states after departure 3 29 The Appalachian and Western Compacts also have adopted
these provisions.330 The Central Midwest and Midwest Compacts require five years advance notice before withdrawal, but a state-assigned host status may withdraw immediately. 331 The Central and
Northeast Compacts require a five-year advance notice from any state
seeking to withdraw. 32
In comparison, the compacts created by our system, as we have
stated, are legislatively fixed.333 States will not be afforded the opportumty to withdraw from their assigned compact if unwilling to share m
the collective management of waste disposal. Considered in light of
the available evidence, the inclusion of a non-withdrawal provision in
waste disposal legislation is critical. We have already recognized that
states will tend to align themselves in a manner which best serves their
individual interests.334 We have also seen that what states perceive to
be their best interests is often in direct conflict with the national interest in a legitimate waste disposal program.335 Therefore, the states, if
left to their own devices, will decline to commit themselves to a bindmg compact agreement which may threaten their perceived selfinterests.
The ability to withdraw from a compact will likely lead to a gradual
chain reaction of bailouts as states determine that "go it alone" options or still smaller alliances would reduce the total volume of waste
they could potentially become obliged to handle.3 36 In other words,
the right to opt out of compact membership allows states to enjoy
328. Prochaska, supra note 85, at 395; see also Southeast Compact, Pub. L. No. 101171, 103 Stat. 1289, art. VII, § G (1991).
329. Prochaska, supra note 85 at 395; see also Rocky Mountain Compact, Pub. L.
No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, 1909, art. VIII, § D (1986).
330. Prochaska, supra note 85 at 395-96; see also Appalachian Compact, Pub. L.
No. 100-319, 102 Stat. 471, 481, art. 5, § D (1988); Western Compact, Pub. L. No. 91461, 84 Stat. 979, art. VII, § D (1970).
331. Prochaska, supra note 85, at 396; see also Central Midwest Compact, Pub. L.

No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, 1891, art. VIII, §§ D, F (1986); Midwest Compact, Pub. L.
No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, 1900-01, art. VIII, §§ E, I (1986).
332. Prochaska, supra note 85, at 396; see also Central Compact, Pub. L. No. 99240, 99 Stat. 1842, 1870, art. VII, § D (1986); Northeast Compact, Pub. L. No. 99-240,
99 Stat. 1842, 1922, art. VII, § H (1986).
333. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.

334. See supra notes 276-84 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 278-325 and accompanying text.
336. Prochaska, supra note 85, at 394 ("A state will exercise its nght to withdraw
If the state determines that
whenever the compact works against its interests.
withdrawing from the compact rather than becoming the host state is in its best interests, politically and economically, then the state will withdraw.").
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temporarily the benefits of shipping waste from their borders, while
permitting them to abandon subsequently the compact when called
upon to serve as host.337 Consequently, it is quite possible that the
approximately fourteen original compacts under the LLRWPAA will
rapidly deteriorate into an abysmal arrangement resulting in twenty or
more sites. Whether included in LLRWPAA compact charters or m
those of our suggested compacts, the eventual outcome of a withdrawal provision will be a disjointed and inefficient compact system
grounded in state self-dealing. Truly, liberal withdrawal provisions
promote disarray and encourage the lack of stability, equity, uniformity and certainty which sound the death-knell for an effective waste
disposal system. Our system of immutable groupings will maintain capacity at an optimal level within each compact, retain profitability for
site operators, hold disposal costs low, and eliminate the incentive for
waste generators to pursue potentially hazardous avenues for waste
disposal.
2. A Proposal for the Siting and Waste Disposal Processes
At this point we have identified a potentially useful system for
grouping states into compacts. The next step is to determine an efficacious means of achieving efficient waste disposal within each of the
respective compacts. This facet of the suggested approach begins with
provisions for the siting process.
a. Identifying Site Locations
In order to ensure a constant and reliable source of disposal capacity for each compact, every state must be required by law to pinpoint
an area within its borders suitable for disposal site construction. A
guidepost figure of approximately 0.5 square miles could be suggested.338 To prevent foot-dragging and excessive delay on the part of
state governments, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
should be empowered to make final, unilateral decisions in this regard.339 However, state officials could be permitted to participate in
337. Id. ("A state designated by the compact as the host state will consider withdrawing from the compact to prevent the location of a regional disposal site within its
borders.").
338. The figure is based on the size of the Barnwell, South Carolina disposal facility, which will be used for our purposes as a template for the desired capacity of all
sites under our plan. The Barnwell site is located on approximately 350 acres of land
and maintains a total disposal capacity of 48,000,000 cubic feet of waste. Given that
one square mile is equivalent to 690 acres, 350 acres is equivalent to roughly one half
of one square mile. Thus, it is suggested that each site constructed under our plan be
.5 square miles m area and have a total available disposal capacity of 48,000,000 cubic
feet. However, it should be noted that states will differ significantly m terms of the
size of the site locations they are able to identify.
339. The suggested plan envisions the creation of a Commission for each of the six
proposed compacts. Each Compact Commission would be headed by a NRC "Commissioner" empowered to render final, unilateral siting decisions within the compact.
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the site selection process, hence facilitating the task. The NRC, together with state representatives, would then investigate relevant aspects of each state which bear upon the siting process, such as human
population demographics, water levels, geological considerations, environmental factors and meteorological data, in order to identify a potential location for siting within each state.34°

Our earlier discussions emphasized that, given the present annual
national waste output, economic realities prevent the siting of every
state within each compact.341 Moreover, the United States, although
faced with a disposal crisis, simply does not generate enough low-level
waste to warrant fifty disposal facilities. How, then, do we decide
which states are to be chosen initially as a site within each compact?
The first, and most rudimentary solution, is simply to pick up where
the LLRWPAA left the siting process. Under the 1985 Act, at least
thirteen states have taken the first, albeit tentative, steps toward developing a disposal facility.3 42 These states are dispersed in such a way
to provide at least one host state for each of our proposed regional
groups, except the Southern Midwest Compact.343 Common sense
dictates that the time and money already expended on the developA Commissioner's decisions regarding his compact would be subject only to the
broader approval of the NRC as a whole. However, Compact Commission membership ranks would also provide for representatives from each state within the compact
who could contribute to the decision-making process, help gather necessary techmcal
data, and otherwise identify relevant problems and issues.
The federal government, through the NRC, already retains exclusive authority to
regulate low-level wastes from generation to disposal. Berkovitz, supra note 11, at
450. The NRC alone is permitted to decide how to regulate hazards associated with
source, special nuclear, or byproduct materals. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c. Therefore, vesting
the NRC with unilateral authority to render siting decisions would not represent an
exceptional exercise of federal power. Even the LLRWPAA explicitly provided that
nothing in the Act would be construed to empower any state with new authority to
regulate the generation, treatment, management, transportation, or disposal of lowlevel wastes contrary to NRC or DOT regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(b)(3). Similarly, under the 1985 Act, states are not permitted to regulate those materials already
addressed by the NRC. Id.
340. Many of the factors listed m the text which could potentially guide NRC siting
decisions are currently listed in the Federal Regulations. 10 C.F.R. §§ 61.12-61.13
(1992).
341. See supra notes 243-73 and accompanying text.
342. See 1989 REPORT, supra note 4, at vi (Figure S-1). States which have begun
the siting process under the LLRWPAA are as follows: Califorma, Colorado, Texas,
Nebraska, Michigan, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvama, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Maine, Connecticut, and North Carolina. Id. These states do not include the three
states which currently house operational disposal sites (Nevada, South Carolina, and
Washington). Id.
343. Based on current LLRWPAA siting progress, the 1985 Act provides host state
candidates for the compacts envisioned under our plan as follows: Northeastern
Compact: Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine; Southeastern Compact: North Carolina and New Jersey; N. Mid-West: Illinois and Michigan; S. Mid-West: None; Central West: Texas, Nebraska, and Colorado; West:
California and Washington. See id.
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ment of new sites under the LLRWPAA not be wasted, regardless of
how inadequate the effort has proved.
This approach creates two new problems. The first is deciding
which state should host the Southern Midwest Compact under our
plan. The second dilemma arises out of the fact that the LLRWPAA
has produced thirteen "volunteer" host states, considerably more than
our program, and indeed the nation, requires. Which states should be
reprieved? These difficulties can be resolved easily through the NRC.
The Commission could develop a preference ranking which would
take into account a host of factors germane to the siting process. The
Commission could consider the full spectrum of ecological and environmental data, 3" the degree to which a state has already initiated
siting formalities and the geographical advantages, if any, of siting a
particular state with respect to its accessibility to other compact members. Each state within each compact would be assigned an index
value indicating its suitability as a host state based on these factors.
Based on this hierarchy, the NRC would dictate the states which are
to be sited when appropriate. Note, however, that this ranking procedure would essentially be a matter of defining degrees. Under our
within each
plan, the NRC would already have identified a location
345
siting.
for
acceptability
minimum
least
at
of
state
b. The Disposal Process
After the site selection process has been completed, each compact
would initially be required to begin federally-supervised construction
of a disposal facility in one of its member states according to federallyinposed timetables. Site lands, identified durmg the site-selection
phase, 346 would still be owned by the state, and private waste operators would continue to lease the land from the state government? 4 7
Any and all emergency situations or disposal capacity shortages during the site development phase would be quickly expedited through
joint action by the NRC and the Department of Transportation
(DOT). 348 After the initial siting phase, generators within each com344. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.

346. Id.
347 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
348. At present, both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of
Transportation have jurisdiction over the transportation of radioactive materials. 44
Fed. Reg. 38,690 (1979). Thus, these agencies appear to be best suited for the handling of disruptive emergency situations during the site-selection and initial siting
phases.
Since our plan requires that NRC officials remain active within each region during
the siting process m order to devise the ranking index and select potential site locations within each state, see supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text, efficiency demands that each compact be presided over by a NRC "Commissioner" Emergency
access decisions would be most effectively made through the unilateral decree of the
NRC Commissioner assigned to the affected region. Such decisions would be made in
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pact would begin to ship their waste to the host state. The nation
would then have a regional disposal system consisting of six sites.
Shortly after the original six sites begin operations, the NRC would
order the construction of a second tier of sites in pre-determined
states within each compact 3 49 This second level of sited states would
be selected by means of the NRC ranking index discussed earlier.350
The total number of sited states would then stand at twelve.351
i. Rotation Systems
The previous suggestion appears to defy the very criticism we inyoked to invalidate the LLRWPAA system: an over-abundance of facilities will be constructed leading to econonic hardship among
private site operators.3 52 However, the NRC would establish a "servitude period" for the original sited states which would vary based on
the waste levels handled by each compact.353 The two sited states
within each compact would then operate on a rotation basis, accepting
all compact waste for the "servitude period," then closing the site until
the expiration of the second sited state's term. State governments
would be charged with the monitoring of the site during its dormant
phase, much akin to a staggered version of the institutional control
concept currently required by the Federal Regulation. 54 Unsited
compact members would be primarily responsible for the financing of
monitoring processes. Thus, rather than inundating a site with waste
until it has reached capacity and then proceeding to require a permanent site closure followed by a one hundred year period of state-supervised monitoring, the suggested plan envisions sporadic periods of
institutional control followed by a renewed period of disposal operaconjunction with the DOT, which currently has authority over the routing of low-level
waste shipments, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1988). By bringing the decision-making
process "closer to home," excessive delay and the attendant threats to public safety
could be avoided. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2021f (outlining the time-consuming emergency
access procedure under the LLRWPAA). See also supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. Temporary provisions for emergency access to either existing commercial
disposal sites or federal disposal facilities could be ordered. Either private firms or
DOT officials could be charged with emergency transportation duties, and the cost of
emergency slpments would be borne by the compact invoking the process. For further discussion of the emergency access procedure during the actual disposal process,
see infra note 437 and accompanying text.
349. The length of time between the siting of the first tier of sites and the second
tier could be adjusted based on relevant economic considerations. See infra notes
440-42 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 344-47 and accompanying text.
351. Construction of the second tier of sites within each compact would yield
twelve sites as follows: Total of 6 compacts, 2 sites per compact = 12.
352. See supra notes 243-73 and accompanying text.
353. Compacts in Region I would have shorter "servitude periods" than compacts
in Regions II and III, due to the comparatively larger waste loads to be handled by
Region I compacts. See Table 1. Likewise, Region II compacts would have shorter
"servitude periods" than Region IH compacts. See id.
354. See 10 C.F.R. § 61.7(c)(4); supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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tions. As a result, no more than six sites would be operational at any
given time, thus providing financial stability for site operators.3 5 5 The
financial interests of private operators would also be protected
through a requirement obligating each compact with a single firm for
the construction and operation of all sites which may become necessary within the region.3 56 Annual ceiling levels could be imposed to

355. See supra notes 243-73 and accompanying text.
356. Tins proposal does not appear to create any impernmissible conflict with federal
antitrust laws, even assuming that the suggested contracting restriction would ordinarily violate the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). The Supreme Court
has affirmed the principle that where a restraint on trade or monopolization is the
result of legitimate governmental action, as distinguished from private action, no violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act can be properly advanced. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961); Trucking
Unlimited v. Califorma Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755,757 (9th Cir. 1970), affd, 404
U.S. 508 (1972). See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Moreover, the Sherman Antitrust Act has been construed to prohibit only those trade restraints and monopolizations that are created or attempted through the acts of "individuals or
combinations of individuals or corporations." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 57 (1911) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, a host of federal decisions have echoed the well-established rule that
the federal government and private individuals acting pursuant to federal directives
are exempt from antitrust scrutiny. See National Genmedical Hosp. & Gerontology
Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378 (1981) (confirming that private parties acting at the
direction or with the consent of federal agencies fall outside of the scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (holding
that where Congress gave the SEC power to approve stock exchanges' system of fixed
commission rates, both SEC and stock exchanges were immune from antitrust liability); Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Coop. Inc., 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1968)
(shielding from antitrust scrutiny the Rural Electrification Administration's conditiomng loans to Alabama electric co-ops on the members of each co-op obligating
themselves to purchase electricity solely from the co-op for 35 years), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1000 (1968); Sakamoto v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 764 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir.
1985) ("[A]cts of both state governments and federal instrumentalities are immune
from antitrust liability."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v.
Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131, 135 (8th Cir. 1970) ("the antitrust laws do not
apply to state government or activities undertaken pursuant to legislative mandate");
Williams Elec. Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 772 F Supp. 1225, 1231 (N.D. Fla. 1991)
(denying antitrust relief where general contractor for Air Force alleged that defendant contractor had illegally conditioned its performance of certain items to receiving
all of general contractor's work on related items and Air Force "required" general
contractor to subcontract with defendant contractor: "[W]hen a federal agency or
official is authorized by law to, and does, direct or require a non-government party's
anticompetitive conduct, the non-government party acting pursuant to that direction
or requirement is immune from federal antitrust liability."), rev'd on other grounds,
854 F.2d 389 (11th Cir. 1988); Medical Ass'n of Alabama v. Schweiker, 554 F Supp.
955, 966 (M.D. Ala. 1983) ("The Sherman Antitrust Act's prohibition on the making
of agreements in restraint of trade is not applicable to the federal government and its
officials acting in their official capacity."), affd sub nom. Medical Ass'n of Alabama
v. Heckler, 714 F.2d 107 (11th Cir. 1983); Heath v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 325 F Supp.
223 (D. Colo. 1971) (refusing to impose antitrust liability on the grounds that valid
governmental action cannot give rise to a claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act
where the alleged private anti-competitive activity was the result of the Federal Forest
Service policy). See generally John P Ludington, Annotation, Valid Governmental
Action as Conferring Immunity or Exemption From Private Liability Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 12 A.L.R. FED. 329 (1972) (reviewing federal cases which deal
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prevent excessive disposal fees, or a yearly review could be utilized to
eliminate potential price-gouging by the private operators. 5 7 Addiplan with respect to economic feasibility will be
tional support for35 our
8
advanced below.
ii. Siting Future Facilities: A Suggested Approach vs. The
LLRWPAA Approach
Next, how should the plan resolve a situation in which a disposal
site has reached its maximum capacity9 The state is quickly "phased
out" of the rotation system and a new host is selected according to the
NRC indexing scale.359 This procedure would merely require careful
advance planning to ensure that the new host is prepared to begin
disposal activities as the old host ceases operations. What happens if a
particular compact's total waste output increases dramatically so as to
render the two-state rotation system mequitable? The answer lies m
federally-established "trigger levels." Based on total waste-load
figures, future estimates and existing site capacities within each compact, the NRC will determine a fixed level of waste at which a two-site
disposal program would no longer be desirable. When total compact
waste production reaches this level, the "trigger provision" would actiwith the types of valid governmental actions which can serve to exempt the conduct of
private individuals or corporations from federal antitrust liability).
recurs no federal
In addition, relevant case law indicates that "a private person
antitrust liability for monopolization of trade or commerce where his monopoly result[s] from an exclusive license or franchise validly conferred [on him] by a governmental body." Id. at 336. Such a grant may provide an alternative avenue for
implementing the recommended exclusive contracting provisions.
Applying the foregoing authorities, our system demands that final siting and disposal decisions within each compact be made, subject to a broader NRC approval, by
NRC officials serving as compact commissioners for each of six individual compact
commissions. See supra note 348 and accompanying text. As a result, the actions of a
compact would ultimately be the actions of the NRC. The procurement of a single
private contractor for the compact's siting activities, pursuant to the direct mandate
issued by our proposed federal law, would therefore clearly constitute authorized governmental action by the NRC, a federal agency. Consequently, private firms contracting for exclusive rights to siting jobs within each compact would be acting at the
request of, and with the consent of, a legally-authorized federal agency, the NRC, and
hence receive immunity from the antitrust laws.
Finally, it is important to note that, governmental immunity aside, the exclusive
contractor provision may not be deemed anti-competitive under the Sherman Act.
The bids for each compact would be open and competitive, and selected firms would
simply be bound to a contract which, by its terms, imposes obligations on the contractor for the duration of the compact's existence. General contractors selected within
each compact would be free to subcontract ancillary tasks to other firms upon approval by the NRC.
357. The NRC would be responsible for disposal fee evaluation whether in the
form of strict price ceilings, or a more permissive review of the reasonableness of
disposal charges. Representatives from site-operating firms and waste generators
would be encouraged to actively participate in the review process.
358. See infra notes 402-30 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 343-45 and accompanying text.
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vate. The NRC would then order the next highest unsited state on the
preference index to begin site construction. The new sited state would
then join the rotation system, at first receiving waste for longer "servitude periods" than its fellows. The "servitude period" of the new site
would then gradually diminish to a level equivalent to that of the
other two sites. The massive capacity for disposal possessed by each
of our eight-state compacts allows this procedure to repeat five more

times if necessary.
Rotation systems and "trigger provisions" are already included in
the charters of many LLRWPAA-approved compacts. However,
these mechanisms are used inefficiently within the compacts created
under the 1985 Act. A few examples will illustrate the point. In the
Southeast Compact, no state is required to serve as host for longer

than twenty years, or beyond the receipt of thirty-two million cubic
feet of waste.360 Each member must take its turn as host. Thus, each
of the eight members will be required to develop a site within, at most,
the next 140 years. 36 1 The Rocky Mountain Compact contains a
twenty percent trigger provision: any state generating more than 20%
of the region's waste must serve as host state.36 2 The Central Midwest

Compact provides that any state generating more than 10% of the
compact's waste will be subject to host liability 363 The Appalachian
Compact requires that any state generating more than 25% of Penn360. Southeast Compact, sec. 2, art. 5, § E.
361. The 140-year figure is a very conservative estimate. There are eight member
states m the Southeast Compact. Table 2. South Carolina currently hosts the compact's site, and North Carolina is likely to take over as host at some point between
1994 and 1996. See supra note 286. At that point, two of the Compact's eight members will be sited. North Carolina will then serve for 20 years, with Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virgima building sites thereafter at 20-year intervals. See Southeast Compact, sec. 2, art. 5, § E. Therefore, the final unsited Southeast
Compact state should complete construction on its disposal facility in about 120 years
from 1994-1996. The 140-year figure will be used as a safe estimate which "factors in"
potential continued delay m the siting of North Carolina, see supra note 286, or delays
m the siting of the other subsequent Southeast Compact host states. The 140-year
estimate also assumes that the siting process will not be accelerated by one or more
member states reaching the target level of 32,000,000 cubic feet before the passage of
20 years. See id.
362. Rocky Mountain Compact, art. III, § C. Based on 1989 figures, the
LLRWPAA's Rocky Mountain Compact can be expected to receive approximately
10,215 cubic feet of waste each year. Table 2. Given the 20% trigger provision,
Rocky Mountain Compact, art. III, § C, any state producing 2,043 cubic feet of waste
or more in a year would become obliged to serve as host. Id. Thus, New Mexico,
which recently generated 1,369 cubic feet of waste, Table 1, appears likely to eventually incur host status.
363. Central Midwest Compact, art. VI, § C. Based on 1989 figures, the Central
Midwest Compact can be expected to produce approximately 143,353 cubic feet of
waste per annum. Table 2. Given the ten percent trigger provision, Central Midwest
Compact, art. VI, § C, if Kentucky generates 14,335 cubic feet of waste or more in a
year, it will be obliged to serve as host for the Compact. Id Kentucky, which in a
recent year generated 10,047 cubic feet of waste, Table 1, appears likely to eventually
incur host status.
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3
sylvania's waste must at least become host to its own waste . 1 California is required to serve as the Southwestern Compact's host for 30
years, but thereafter siting responsibility can be imposed upon the
next-highest waste producer m the group. 65 Thus, it is possible that
Compact will have sited all of its members within 90
the Southwestern
6

years.

36

The problem with these arrangements is that they cavalierly provide
for the construction of new disposal sites like so many corner lemonade stands. The provisions have one objective: to ensure that the host
state is not required to accept large amounts of out-of-state waste.3 67

In pursuit of this goal, all other considerations are ignored. The trigger provisions are not based on an actual need for additional capacity,
nor are they cognizant of costs. The clauses are included because
otherwise states would refuse to play the compact game.
It is, of course, possible that m the distant future, perhaps centuries

from the present day, every state will eventually be obliged to assume
host status. As the years pass, existing waste sites will gradually reach
capacity, thus necessitating the construction of new facilities. Nevertheless, the true shortcoming of the LLRWPAA-compact rotation systems and trigger provisions is that they threaten to site an excessive
number of states in the early years of the disposal process. Prime examples, as we have seen, are the LLRWPAA's Southeast and Southwestern Compacts which, based on their charter provisions, are likely
364. Appalachian Compact, art. M, § D. Based on 1989 data, Pennsylvama can be
expected to produce approximately 129,440 cubic feet of waste per year. Table 1. The
Compact's trigger provision activates at a waste level equal to 25% of Pennsylvama's
waste production level, Appalachian Compact, art. III, § D, i.e., --32,360 cubic feet of
waste. Therefore, Maryland, which rn a recent year produced roughly 39,985 cubic
feet of waste, Table 1, appears destined to incur host status m the Appalachian
Compact.
365. Southwestern Compact, Pub. L. No. 100-712, 102 Stat. 4773, 4779, art. IV, § C
(1988). The Southwestern Compact gives California the option of extending its 30year tenure as host, but "[i]f the state of California does not extend this obligation,
the party state, other than the state of Califorma, which is the largest major generator
state shall then serve as the host state for the second regional disposal facility." Id. In
art. II, § K the Compact's "Definitions" define "major generator state" as a party
state which generates ten percent of the region's waste, but provides that "[i]f no
party state other than California generates at least ten percent of the total amount,
'Major generator state' means the party state which is second to Califorma in the
amount of waste produced within the compact region and disposed of at the regional
disposal facility." Id. The second state then serves as host for 30 years. Id. at art. IV,
§ C. Presumably, host responsibilities would then pass to the next-highest waste producer m the Compact.
366. The Southwestern Compact has four members. Table 2. Arizona is already
slated to serve as host after California's 30-year disposal duty. Blake, supra note 139,
at 55. The provisions of the Compact suggest that the two other member states may
be obliged to serve as hosts at 30-year intervals following Arizona's period of host
liability. See supra note 365. Thus, it is possible that all of the Southwest Compact's
members could be sited within 90 years of the date upon which the California facility
becomes operational.
367. See supra notes 278-324 and accompanying text.

170

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

to site each of their respective members within the next 140 years,
regardless of whether waste production drops within these Compacts
in the future.3 6 In fact, the 1985 Act appears likely to create approximately 24 new sites within that period.3 6 9 An unexpected surge of
waste production in other LLRWPAA compacts will activate trigger
provisions and drive the total even higher.3 70
368. See supra notes 361, 365 and accompanying text. Neither the Southeast Compact nor the Southwestern Compact explicitly provides for eliminating the construction of new sites should total waste output in the respective regions decrease
appreciably. See generally Southeast Compact, sec. 2, art. V, § E; Southwestern Compact, art. IV, § C.
369. The figure of 24 sites within the next 140 years is a conservative estimate with
regard to potential future siting activities under the LLRWPAA. The 1985 Act imtially envisions a total of 14 sites, including both "go it alone" and compact member
states: California, Colorado, Nebraska, Texas, Michigan, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvama, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine, North Carolina, and Washington. Table 2. The Southeast Compact, pursuant to its charter, promises to site six
additional sites, excluding current host state South Carolina, in the next 140 years:
Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia. See Southeast Compact, art. V, § E. The Southwestern Compact has the ability to site three additional
states over the next 90 years: Arizona, North Dakota, and South Dakota. See supra
note 365. Three states, Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and the District of
Columbia are currently unaffiliated under the LLRWPAA, and may eventually decide
to "go it alone." Table 2. Finally, three of the LLRWPAA compacts assessed in the
text, see supra notes 360-62 and accompanying text, appear likely to site an additional
state each based on their respective "trigger" provisions: Rocky Mountain Compact
(New Mexico), Central Midwest Compact (Kentucky) and Appalachian Compact
(Maryland). Id. The 24-site figure ignores the strong possibility that liberal withdrawal provisions will lead to the subsequent siting of additional "go it alone" states.
See supra notes 322-35 and accompanying text. Thus, under the worst possible scenano, yet still ignoring the possibility of withdrawal, the LLRWPAA could lead to a
total of 30 sites within the next 140 years.
The arguments which follow in the text are based on the 24-site figure in an attempt
to err on the side which least supports the conclusions drawn. It should be noted that
the conservative 24-site estimate is grounded in the following assumptions regarding
the first 140 years of the LLRWPAA's disposal activities: (1) Only two of the four
unaffiliated LLRWPAA states will choose to "go it alone" and develop new sites, (2)
No state will choose to withdraw from their compact, (3) The Southwestern Compact
will not attempt to impose host liability, although it is so able, on North Dakota or
South Dakota, (4) No state in the Rocky Mountain, Central Midwest, or Appalachian
Compact will reach "trigger" levels, and thus incur host liability, even though previous discussions have revealed the great likelihood that at least one state in each of
these compacts will reach these milestones, see supra notes 360-62, and (5) The Central, Midwest, and Northwest Compacts will site no states beyond their initial host
states within the next 140 years.
370. To make matters worse, it is readily apparent that "trigger" provisions could
activate, hence increasing siting activity in LLRWPAA compacts, even in the face of a
net decrease in total waste production within a region. This phenomenon can occur
because LLRWPAA "trigger" provisions are generally established on a percentage
basis. As a simple illustration, unagine a fictitious compact with a 20% "trigger" provision consisting of four member states with the following annual waste outputs (in
cubic feet): State A. 11,000; State B: 5,000; State C: 5,000; State D: 5,000. Under
this scenario with a 20% "trigger" provision, State B, C and D would be obliged to
assume host liability at 20% x 26,000 = 5,200 cubic feet annual production. Now
suppose that State A's annual waste production drops to 9,000 cubic feet. The compact's total waste output is now 24,000 cubic feet, and the "trigger" provision activates
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While providing for long-term disposal capacity is an essential goal,
it should be kept in mind that the Barnwell, South Carolina site alone
has functioned with surprising effectiveness while accepting well over
371
50% of the nation's total waste output for more than two decades.
In comparison, the Southeast Compact, by far LLRWPAA's most
waste-intensive alliance, will be required to handle only about 30% of
the nation's total waste output each year. 371 The inescapable conclusion is that when unsited states reach LLRWPAA-compact trigger
levels or sited-state charter terms expire, in most cases additional disposal capacity will nonetheless not be needed within the affected region. The existing site(s) within each group will still be more than
capable of handling the additional volume; Barnwell accommodates a
full year's worth of waste, approximately 800,000 cubic feet, in a single
90' x 750' disposal trench.373
Nevertheless, under such circumstances LLRWPAA compact charters will dictate that new facilities must be constructed. Siting will occur not because additional capacity will be necessary due to a rising
volume of low-level waste production, but merely as a means to appease states which would otherwise have foregone the more stable
and efficient regional approach to waste disposal through withdrawal
or refusal to join a compact at the outset.374 In addition, the situation
becomes more tenuous when we recall that LLRWPAA compact provisions offer withdrawal as an option to unsited states which are eventually called upon to serve as host.3 75 'This alternative, if exercised,
will further disrupt and fragment the disposal process, leading to more
sites and higher disposal, moitoring and construction costs.
Indeed, our earlier discussions have revealed that the construction
and operation of a waste disposal facility is an extremely expensive
undertaking.376 Unnecessary siting entails not only the burdensome
fixed construction costs incurred when developing any site, but also
increased monitoring costs as more sites are left dormant during rotation interim periods. Disposal fees will have to rise drastically to meet
the expense associated with the prolonged initial rush of siting activity.3 7 7 Even assuming that no state chooses the withdrawal alternative, costs will already be unduly high in LLRWPAA compacts as
private operators attempt to squeeze a profit out of the insufficient
at 20% x 24,000 = 4800 cubic feet. States B, C, and D must now become hosts.
Therefore, a 2,000 cubic foot net decrease m the compact's total waste production has
resulted m the siting of three additional states. Although such a drastic situation is
unlikely to arise under the LLRWPAA, the example serves to vividly demonstrate the
inherent flaws in the compact system created by the 1985 Act.
371. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
372. See Table 2.
373. Telephone Interview with Frank Roberts, supra note 23.
374. See supra notes 325-37 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 325-37 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 259-63 and accompanying text.
377. Md
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stream of waste to be handled in most of the original fourteen sited
states and regions 378 A portion of these costs will be passed along to
taxpayers and consumers; the rest will be absorbed by hapless waste
generators who may find themselves nostalgically yearning for the return of the current surcharge and penalty fee fiasco. 379 Renewed incentives to engage in illegal dumping and on-site storage practices win
be realized. Quite simply, it is neither economically feasible nor desirable to rapidly develop an inordinate number of sites simply to spare
the states from "oppressive" disposal responsibilities.
In an attempt to convert these generalizations into a more realistic
form, a brief example should illustrate the likely effects of rapid and
unnecessary siting under the LLRWPAA system. Assuming an average national waste output of 1.5 million cubic feet per year,380 the
United States must be equipped to handle about 210,000,000 cubic
feet of waste over the next 140 years.381 The Barnwell, South Carolina site has a maximum waste capacity of approximately 48,000,000
cubic feet, a capacity which has been termed "average" by Chem-Nuclear officials. 382 The entire facility is located on roughly 325 acres of
land, or slightly more than one half of a square mile.383 A plot of this
size is hardly an unrealistic demand upon individual states for use in a
national disposal program, and we have previously noted that the
48,000,000 cubic feet is to be used as the guidepost figure representative of the rough disposal capacity of sites under our system. 384 Thus,
this estimate will be applied, for our purposes, as the predicted maximum disposal capacity of sites constructed under our plan, as well as
those to be created under the LLRWPAA. However, it should still be
remembered that many states are unlikely to be capable of identifying
within their borders a plot of land of this size. Nevertheless, the discussions which follow should illustrate the general point intended.
After construction of the first two tiers of compacts under our plan,
the nation will possess about 576,000,000 (12 sites x 48 million cubic ft.
capacity per site) cubic feet of disposal capacity. Thus, after 140 years,
our system will still be able to function for at least another century
before even beginmng to consider construction of a new facility.385
378. See Table 2; Figure 2.
379. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
380. This figure is a realistic average level which is based on annual low-level waste
output levels over recent years including 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992. See
supra note 137.
381. 1,500,000 cubic feet x 140 years = 210,000,000 cubic feet capacity needed. The
140-year figure is used as a convenient reference point through which to evaluate and
compare the respective outcomes of the LLRWPAA compact scheme and the proposed plan. The significance of this number is detailed supra at note 361.
382. Telephone interview with Frank Roberts, supra note 23.
383. Id.
384. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
385. Total capacity needed: 1,500,000 cubic feet x 140 years = 210,000,000 cubic
feet. Total available national capacity after the siting of two tiers of facilities within
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Now let us look at the same situation under the LLRWPAA compact scheme. We have recognized that LLRWPAA charter provisions
ultimately provide that the country will have about 24 sites within the
next 140 years.38 6 This rapid development of facilities will yield, still
assuming an average site capacity of 48,000,000 cubic feet, 38 7 a total of
1,152,000,000 cubic feet of disposal capacity to handle the relatively
meager 210,000,000 cubic feet of waste actually produced over the 140
year period.388 Meanwhile millions, even billions, of dollars will have
been unnecessarily expended on the monitoring and construction of
new sites over this period.3 8 9 Tins is to say nothing of the millions of
dollars in excessive disposal fees wich will have to be charged by
private operators to waste generators in order to realize a profit from
the inadequate flow of waste we have recognized in many of the
LLRWPAA-approved compacts. 390 It would take close to 800 years
to fill these sites.39 ' Once again, remember that trigger provisions in
LLRWPAA compacts other than the Southeast and Southwest alliances and liberal withdrawal rights threaten to increase the total
number of sites developed under the 1985 Act well beyond the mirimum figure of twenty-four facilities.3 2 In addition, the lack of future
capacity we have recognized within several of the LLRWPAA's
smaller compacts may force the dissolution of these groups, hence
serving to bolster further the total site count.393 While the above
figures are based on rough generalizations and assumptions regarding
annual waste output levels and the maximum disposal capacities of
potential future sites, they are also substantially grounded in existing
realities. The wide disparity in the figures under each system make
each compact: 12 sites x 48,000,000 cubic feet capacity per site - 576,000,000 cubic
feet. After 140 years, remaining disposal capacity is: 576,000,000 cubic feet 210,000,000 cubic feet = 366,000,000 cubic feet. The 366,000,000 cubic feet of extra
available disposal capacity after 140 years provides: 366,000,000 cubic feet / 1,500,000
cubic feet per year = =244 additional years of disposal capacity. Therefore, our system
theoretically provides roughly 384 years (140 + 244) of disposal capacity upon completion of the two tiers of facilities within each proposed compact.
386. See supra note 369.
387. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
388. A total of 24 sites x 48,000,000 cubic feet = 1,152,000,000 cubic feet available
disposal capacity under the LLRWPAA system. See supra notes 336-37.
389. See supra notes 243-63 and accompanying text.
390. Id.
391. Total capacity needed over 140 years: 1,500,000 cubic feet x 140 years =
210,000,000. Total available capacity under the LLRWPAA system: 24 sites x
48,000,000 cubic feet of disposal capacity per site = 1,152,000,000 cubic feet. Total
remaimng disposal capacity after 140 years under LLRWPAA system: 1,152,000,000 210,000,000 = 942,000,000 cubic feet. The 942,000,000 cubic feet of extra available
disposal capacity after the 140-year period provides: 942,000,000 cubic feet / 1,500,000
cubic feet = =628 years of additional disposal capacity. Thus, the LLRWPAA theoretically provides roughly 768 years (140 + 628) of disposal capacity after the siting of

about 24 facilities within the first 140 years of disposal operations.
392. See supra note 369-70 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text.
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the overall point abundantly clear: the system advanced by the
LLRWPAA is both economically inefficient and unwarranted.
A more rational approach would permit generators, governments
and consumers to keep their money until the genume need for additional sites is reasonably apparent. Mere "Time Value of Money"
considerations indicate the substantial savings to be realized through
even a brief postponement of the multi-million dollar capital investment required to construct a disposal facility. A slow and methodical
siting process frees up funds which can then be more effectively utilized to finance top-notch site monitoring and selection procedures
which clearly serve the general public's interest in environmental,
health and safety-related arenas. Accordingly, our program authorizes the construction of new sites strictly based on increased need for
capacity within a compact. 394 Trigger provisions are not used to penalize individual states with rising low-level waste outputs; new states are
sited in response to a rising waste level within the whole compact.395
The focus is purely on analyzing pragmatic concerns in order to site
states preferentially based on objective suitability for the duty, and
only when necessary. 396 It refuses to waste time and money through
excessive siting simply to pacify the states.
However, our rotation approach raises an important question. Why
should our unfortunate original sited states be subjected to a prolonged period of disposal duty under our program? The answer is
threefold: (1) Most of these states have already begun siting activities
under the LLRWPAA, 97 (2) the system is economically efficient and
serves the national interest, 398 and (3) based on the ranking index, the
NRC has objectively concluded that each of these states is best-suited
for the task.3 99 Nevertheless, our rotation system provides each sited
state with a periodic respite from disposal duties.' °
Notwithstanding, the preceding discussion evokes questions regardmg the role of the unsited states in our scheme. Aren't they getting
the "free ride" for which we criticized the LLRWPAA compact system?"' Aren't they in effect permitted to hoard their disposal resources while a minority of states shoulder the brunt of the disposal
burden? No. The unsited states serve perhaps the single most important function in the disposal system: insurance. These states remain
in the compact, prepared to assume host status if total compact waste
output rises significantly, or when an existing site reaches capacity
This reliable reserve of available capacity is the element which keeps
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

See supra notes 346-58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 360.
See supra note 394.
See supra notes 243-73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 243-325 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 342-45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 354-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
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costs low and allows the disposal process to function smoothly. Thus,
the system operates such that the original host states will be relieved
of disposal obligations when their sites reach maximum capacity. As a
result, formerly unsited states will become obliged to assume host liability in their stead. Therefore, the original unsited states do not actually receive any inequitable benefit, their duties as hosts are merely
postponed temporarily.
iii. Economic Aspects of the Proposed System
The burdens of waste disposal shouldered by the states under our
plan are to include not only host liability, but also financial liability.
In the LLRWPAA's Southeast Compact, member state taxpayers are
not responsible for financing the operation of the Barnwell site.4' All
costs are passed on to waste generators in the form of inflated disposal
fees. 4°3 Our program seeks to shift part of these expenses to the citizenry of the states within each compact, thereby offering long-overdue relief for waste producers. Rather than directly passing costs
on to private waste generators to create the funds necessary for the
efficient operation of the disposal system, our plan would point to the
individual states. Truly, state taxpayers should receive little sympathy
in relation to financially-oppressed waste producers; remember that
one of our goals is to spread the burdens of waste disposal among the
many constituencies which benefit from waste production.4 °5 Moreover, the interests of taxpayers are inextricably bound to the economic
health of many low-level waste generators; citizens will likely reclaim
a great deal of their investment as local hospitals, universities, research labs, and industries are able to lower prices, increase employment, and operate in a more cost-efficient manner in response to their
newfound financial relief. We will now examine some potential methods through which this cost-shifting effect might be realized, while still
allowing the compacts to acquire the funds necessary for the disposal
system.
First, the single, private contractor for each compact 406 would continue to be responsible for all the normal operational costs of the site,
which generally include expenses related to transportation, soil sampling, on-site momtoring, disposal supervision, lease payments to the
host state's government, and clerical personnel.40 7 The site operator
would not be required to contribute to the costs of site construction or
site monitoring during the interim periods of the rotation system.
Limits would be placed on the extent to which these costs could be
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

Telephone interview with Frank Roberts, supra note 23.
Id.
See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
Telephone interview with Frank Roberts, supra note 23.
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passed on the generators in the form of higher disposal fees. This
might be accomplished either through NRC-established rate ceilings
subject to annual adjustment, or a more flexible approach involving
periodic NRC review of the reasonableness of rates within each compact. Of course, effective rate evaluation would have to take into account several factors, most notably the need to allow reasonable
profitability for site operators in view of their operating costs. The
continued monitoring of disposal fee levels would prevent potential
price-gouging in a monopolistic setting,"° and help serve our important objective - the reduction of the massive financial burden which
has been imposed upon the socially beneficial producers of low-level
waste in recent years.40 9

We have now identified the costs of waste disposal that are to be
borne by the site operator under our plan. We have further identified
a means through which disposal fees can be kept low, and the private
site operator prevented from realizing excessive profits at the waste
generator's expense. However, these solutions create a new problem:
from what source will each compact obtain necessary funding? The
answer: the member states of each compact would initially be responsible for a portion of the various fiscal burdens associated with waste
disposal. More specifically, the states would only be required to account for the funds necessary to construct new sites and monitor site
performance during institutional control periods within their respective compacts. Both sited states and the initial unsited states within
each compact would be equally responsible for these expenses. Indeed, there appears to be no rational reason to burden the original
unsited states with any additional fiscal responsibilities under the program m order to compensate the sited states, primarily because each
unsited state is always subject to future host liability. 410 Nevertheless,
the fiscal role of the unsited states becomes especially crucial due to
the fact that, at any given tune, six of the eight members of each compact will be unsited.4a Therefore, simple mathematics dictate that
these states will ultimately contribute the bulk of essential compact
funds. The funding of compact activities, i.e., construction of necessary sites and the monitoring of sites during interim periods, must occur in two distinct phases, the initial siting phase and the disposal
phase. We will first examine the possibilities for financing the initial
siting phase. Recall from previous discussions that our plan prescribes
408. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.

410. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text. It is possible that technology

or other factors may eliminate the need for a comprehensive low-level waste disposal
system in the distant future, and hence relieve some unsited states from the liability of
assuming host status. The plan could certainly incorporate provisions detailing a realistic means of compensation between sited and unsited member states upon such an
event.

411. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
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a significant initial monetary outlay for the construction of two regiments of six sites.412 As noted above, our program will require the
states within each compact to share the financial burden of this initial
outlay. However, under our federal plan, Congress would employ a
conditional use of its spending power to help generate sufficient funds
for the construction of the two initial tiers of sites within each compact.4 13 After the estimated costs of the initial siting of two facilities
within each compact were determined, Congress would agree to contribute a moderate, fixed percentage of these expenses to each compact, provided that the sited and unsited members of each region
agreed to bear the remainder of the financial liability for the project.
Quite simply, the initial siting costs, after deducting the percentage to
be contributed by the federal government, would be divided among
the populace of the eight member states in each compact.4 14
However, although our plan admittedly calls for an initial spurt of
heavy financing to construct two tiers of sites within each compact, we
have seen that thereafter, qualified by certain educated assumptions,41 5 the program would likely eliminate the need to create additional facilities for about 200 years.4 1 6 It is important to remember
that we are now addressing the economic aspects of the plan throughout the second phase of compact financing, that is, during the extended period of time after the initial construction of two sites within
each compact for which no further site construction is required.41 v
During this period, Congress would again make conditional use of its
spending power to create individual funding accounts for each of the
six compacts. 418 How might these accounts function?
412. See supra notes 346-51 and accompanying text.
413. See mnfra note 418.
414. Projects funded jointly by federal and state governments are certainly no mnovation. Notable examples include the Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396(k)
(1988), and the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601615 (1988). See also Milwaukee County Paver's Ass'n v. Fiedler, 731 F. Supp. 1395
(W.D. Wis. 1990) (discussing a jointly-funded federal-state highway program); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 400 F Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (assessing the validity of a jointlyfunded federal-state irrigation project). In order to prevent the inequitable distribu-

tion of the financial burdens associated with our plan among the taxpayers of member

states, necessary costs would be divided according to population. Therefore, a required capital outlay of $1 million within a compact would not be divided equally
among the eight member states of that compact, but rather among the total popula-

tion residing within the region represented by that compact.

Chem-Nuclear Systems voluntarily established an escrow account to provide fund-

mg for the Barnwell, South Carolina site. Telephone Interview with Frank Roberts,

supra note 23. Site operators under our plan would be free to pursue this avenue for
the funding of their share of compact expenses.

415. See supra notes 382-85 and accompanying text.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. It has been well established that Congress may "attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds. " South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). There-
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Beyond the portion of the disposal fee which is retained by the private site operator, a percentage of these revenues has traditionally accrued to the host state's government. Indeed, the state-owned
disposal site lands are currently leased by the host state to the operator, thus accounting for some of these funds.41 9 As noted earlier, tis
practice is to continue under our scheme. 420 However, our plan would
require annual lease payments from the private site operators to the
host states in each compact to be diverted into the individual federally-adninstered funds for the financing of each compact's activities.
Additional moies for the funds would be generated each year though
a modest federal tax on the disposal fee collected by site operators.4 2
Furthermore, as with the initial siting phase, member states would be
at all times obliged to account for any sums (according to population)
over and above the individual compact fund's total projected annual
balance necessary to the moitoring of compact sites each year. In
other words, during each year of the second financing phase, the individual compacts would estimate the total funds necessary during the
coming year to finance activities m their respective compacts. If this
sum should exceed the compact's total projected account balance, the
eight members would be required to provide these additional finances. This process will be fully clarified momentarily.
Provided that the site states within each compact agreed to divert
lease payments plus their share of any additional capital which might
be necessary for the financing of compact activities into their fund
each year, and provided that the unsited states contribute their annual
allotted portion of the capital necessary to finance compact activities
(if any), the federal government would then bolster each of the six
accounts by an additional fixed percentage of each compact fund's
projected annual balance. Thus, individual compacts would begin
each year with the current balance of their funding accounts. Federal
tax revenues derived from total disposal fees would be estimated for
the coming year and total lease payments would also be calculated.
These figures would be added to the current account balance, and the
total sum would be used for the purposes of determining the amount
of federal monies due for the year. After adding the federal funds, if
the total projected fund balance for the year (i.e., current fund balfore, Congress would certainly be permitted to request the payment of certain state
funds m return for federal monies.
419. The LLRWPA places no restrictions on the manner m which funds derived
from disposal activities may be utilized.
420. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
421. These proposals may appear unduly burdensome on private site operators
when evaluated in conjunction with the suggested NRC disposal fee monitoring process. See supra notes 407-09 and accompanying text. However, this process would be
based on the reasonable profitability of private site operators, and thus would take
into account both the annual lease payments to the host state, as well as the level of
the suggested federal tax on the site operator's revenues.

1993]

WASTING AWAY AGAIN

ance plus estimated tax revenues for the coming year, plus total lease
payments for the coming year, plus federal funds for the coming year)
proved to be less than estimated costs, only then would compact member states be required to provide additional funding under the plan. If
additional capital contributions were required from member states
within a compact for a given year, the federal government would then
offset a portion of these sums by contributing a percentage of those
additional funds to the affected compact's account equal to the percentage it contributes to the compact's total annual projected balance.422 As the discussions below will reveal, however, such
additional outlays of capital by compact member states should be
highly unlikely during the second financing phase.
The importance of this funding arrangement is that it would allow
the states in each compact eventually to reduce their financial burden
under our system. During the second phase of compact financing, the
approximately 200-year "period of prosperity," 4' all necessary disposal capacity would already be available, and any new financial obligations of member states under our plan would be substantially reduced.
Since the monetary burdens borne by member states under our program are to include only the costs of site construction and site monitoring during rotation interim periods, necessary compact costs
allocated to the states throughout the second financing phase would
be relegated to expenses associated with the latter activities. In short,
since two tiers of sites will have already been built within each compact pursuant to the first financing phase, expenses should be relatively low throughout the second financing phase. Furthermore, since
the fiscal contributions of member states are to be determined accord422. As a simplified example, suppose Compact A enters the year 1995 with a total
account balance of $500,000. Further suppose that projected federal tax revenues on
disposal site fees for 1995 are $100,000, and the lease payments to be paid by the
private site operator are likewise $100,000. The applicable figure for determining the
annual federal contribution to the compact's fund would thus be $700,000 ($500,000 +

$100,000 + $100,000).

If the federal government has agreed to contribute 30% of the compact's projected
annual fund total to the fund, federal expenditure on Compact A for 1995 would be
$210,000 ($700,000 x .3). This figure is now added to the compact's projected annual
balance. Thus: $700,000 + $210,000 = $910,000. Now suppose that the compact's
projected necessary costs for 1995 are estimated to be $1 million. The member states
of Compact A would then be required to account for the deficient $90,000, divided
according to the total population represented by Compact A's residents. Assuming
that the member states of Compact A contain a total of 50 million people, this would
necessitate a $.0018 tax increase on each citizen in Compact A's region. However, the
federal government would then be required to account for 30% of these deficient
funds, or $27,000 ($90,000 x .3). Therefore, the net additional tax burden on the citizens of Compact A would be ($90,000 - $27,000) /50 million = $.00126. Given that
compacts within Regions II and III under the proposed system appear likely to receive less total waste per annum than Region I, Table 1, equity would demand that the
percentage of funds contributed by the federal government to compact accounts rise
with declining regional waste levels.
423. See supra notes 382-85 and accompanying text.
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ing to the projected needs of the compact each year, and since federal
spending on the program is partially a function of member state outlays to the fund, 424 federal expenditures on the program would also
decline during this period.4' At the same time, the states in each
compact would begin to realize a "return" on their "investment";
lease payments, disposal fee tax revenues, and federal contributions to
the funds would begin to amass. Through financing funds which provide for the gradual accumulation of capital over the extended 200year time period, construction of future waste facilities and the momtoring of existing sites during institutional control periods could eventually become self-financing. In other words, capital which is derived
from lease payments (by private site operators to the host states), a
percentage of disposal fees (from the federal tax on private site operators), and funds provided by the federal government (as dictated by
the proposed legislation) over a 200-year timespan would most likely
recapture the costs of the imtial siting activities, thereby providing sufficient reserves for both future site construction and ongoing monitoring within each compact. Consequently, the original capital outlay
provided by compact member states should be a one-time event; this
original funding would thereafter "work" for the compact. The initial
funds provided by member states would build facilities, which would
in turn generate disposal fees, which would then be drawn annually
from the facility through lease payments and a modest federal tax.
Each year, individual compact funds would be further augmented by
federal finances. Therefore, by the time the original sited states reach
maximum capacity and original unsited states were scheduled to assume host status in their place, the approximately 200-year aggregation of lease payments, tax revenues, and federal monies would likely
prove capable of covering ongoing monitoring costs and funding the
construction of the necessary new sites. The individual waste-producer cannot avail itself of this cyclical flow of capital; waste disposal
funds migrate from the generator via a one-way conduit. Nor could
the vast majority of LLRWPAA compacts employ this method. The
expenses created by the heavy and continuous siting envisioned under
the 1985 Act,4 2 6 as well as the variety of small, fiscally deficient compacts42 7 would create an environment in which reserve funds would be
almost impossible to generate. In fact, these compacts would almost
certainly find themselves in loss positions, thus necessitating further
increases in disposal fees.4 2 Under the LLRWPAA, shifting costs di424. See supra text accompanying notes 419-20.
425. The plan could also provide that the federal government, in response to the
diminished financial obligations of member states during the second phase of compact
financing, would agree to contribute a large percentage of funds annually to each
compact's total fund balance during this period.
426. See supra notes 256-63 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 243-55 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
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rectly to taxpayers would be ill-advised; excessive siting plans would
demand constant funding with no appreciable end in sight. However,
although placing an extra burden on taxpayers is never a desirable
option, the national scope of the low-level waste problem, the efficient
nature of our proposed compact distributions, and the potential availability of a method for "recycling" compact finances make a strong
case for affording waste generators well-deserved pecumary relief.
Thus, the imtial large investment by compact members m site construction attendant to our plan would gradually be offset through a
calculated use of disposal revenues, state funds, and federal funds,
while a reliable network of financially solvent facilities would be implemented. The abolition of LLRWPAA surcharges and penalty
fees,4 2 9 the implementation of rate controls, and the market's natural
price-depressing response to larger, more cost-efficient compacts
would reduce disposal fees to more realistic levels, hence increasing
the cost-efficiency of long-overburdened generators to the benefit of
all states. At the same time, the increased efficiency created by the
relatively large waste-flow within each compact would also allow the
site operator to function profitably within the bounds of our reasonably-limited disposal fee levels and thus generate sufficient additional
funds for lease payments and, through taxation, a modest percentage
of disposal fees to an investment account. Having the member states
as the primary initial source of compact funds shifts burdens away
from waste producers and contributes essential financial security to
the compact, yet potentially allows the states to realize a full return on
their investment.
Regardless of how these admittedly sketchy suggestions would hold
up on the balance sheet, it is difficult to imagine a program more riddled with economic non-sequiturs than that advanced by the states
under LLRWPAA auspices. The purpose here has primarily been to
emphasize the need for curtailing the practice of saddling waste generators with the brunt of the costs associated with waste disposal. An
arrangement which combines a number of large, waste-intensive compacts with restrictions on disposal fees and thoughtful economic policies may well serve our purposes.430

429. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
430. The proposals advanced m the preceding section may require some rather cre-

ative uses of federal commerce, taxing and spending powers in order to pass constitutional muster. The economic aspects of the plan could also necessitate a large degree
of interstate cooperation coupled with federal coordination and regulation. However,
federal authority to regulate in the low-level waste field under the Commerce Clause
is quite broad, and there are several means available to Congress by which to "con-

vince" the states to regulate according to a federal scheme. See infra note 440.

182

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

iv. Defending The Proposed Rotation System
At this point it is helpful to address one final important issue raised
by our proposal. Earlier discussions may have elicited the observation
that, although the LLRWPAA system sites too many states too rapidly, our proposed approach may also be vulnerable to this criticism. 4 3 1 Five facilities must be built originally (Washington has agreed
to keep its facility operational), 432 followed by a second tier of six additional sites. Only after this initial siting of two states per compact
does our prudent need-based siting process become effective.433 Adhering to the rough figures advanced earlier,434 the siting of just one
state within each of our compacts may be sufficient to provide national disposal capacity for over 150 years.435 However, there are several persuasive reasons why an initial capital investment in twelve
sites is desirable.
First, the approach serves to quiet the fears of the citizens of the
original states to be sited within each compact. The rotation of disposal duties between two sited states represents a compromise between
two extremes: the deceptively fair but economically inefficient option
of siting most or all states within each compact from the outset, and
the other alternative which espouses the initial siting of only one state
within each compact. In a purely political context, concerned residents of the sited states are more likely to be receptive to a system
which affords a periodic hiatus from disposal responsibilities at fixed
intervals.436 The possibility of eventual host status for each member
state and the even delegation of economic burdens among compact
members further contributes to the public perception of equity. A
two-state rotation system strikes a balance between the competing
goals of keeping the total number of sites at a mimmum and providing
some semblance of sharing host liability burdens.
Next, the existence of two sites within each compact provides a
readily available source of disposal capacity should an emergency situation arise within a compact. It is possible that during the disposal
process an accident may occur, or soil tests may reveal the migration
of radionuclides from disposal trenches. These unpredictable hazards
may necessitate the temporary closing of a site. Under our two-site
rotation system, waste burdens will not have to be shifted out of the
affected compact, potentially over great distances, m order to avert
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

See supra notes 378-81 and accompanying text.
1989 REPORT, supra note 4, at vi.
See supra notes 393-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 382-83 and accompanying text.
The average disposal facility under our system would be equipped to contain a

rough maximum disposal capacity of 48,000,000 cubic feet, see supra notes 380-81 and
accompanying text. Assuming an average national waste output level of 1,500,000
cubic feet per annum, see supra note 378, six disposal sites should provide disposal

capacity for (48,000,000 x 6) / 1,500,000 = 192 years.
436. See supra notes 352-58 and accompanying text.

1993]

WASTING AWAY AGAIN

crisis. A smooth and uninterrupted transition of waste disposal duties
would be realized without resorting to time consuming and environmentally threatening emergency procedures such as those currently in
place under the LLRWPAA.4 37 The extra funds untially expended to
site two states within each compact is justified by the goal of creating a
system which guards against various unforeseen breakdowns in the
disposal process. The two-tiered rotation system can be viewed as the
eggs we must break to make our omelette.
We have already touched upon some ways in which the impact of
siting the original twelve sites would be diminished. Earlier discussions emphasized that our approach virtually guarantees an extended
period of time after the development of the original twelve sites during which the construction of new sites would be unnecessary.43 As
we have seen, the economic aspects of our program may very well
serve to recapture during tis period the funds initially invested in site
construction by the states.439 As a result, it becomes less financially
burdensome to develop and momtor original and subsequent facilities.
Again, our twelve-site rotation system does not sacrifice the profitability of private site operators; until such time as additional sites are
necessitated by an increased waste-load within a compact, our rotation system ensures that only six sites nationwide will actually receive
waste at any given time." ° Therefore, total waste flow need not be
divided between sites in any compact. Our provision for one contractor per compact further fosters economic stability. The cumulative effect of these proposals is to demonstrate that the financial integrity of
site operators will not be undermined by our two-tiered rotation
scheme. The equitable sharing of host responsibilities and instant access to emergency disposal capacity can be enjoyed without rendering
the entire program a fiscal impossibility. Compare this process with
that of the LLRWPAA, which promises to have at least fourteen sites
operational simultaneously; inadequate waste supplies and onerous
siting plans threaten to crush economic viability. 44' Thus, the difficulties in getting over our initial "hump" of siting twelve states are less
significant than first imagined.
In addition, construction of the second tier of sites could be delayed
long enough under our plan to allow a surplus of funds to accumulate
so as to cushion the financial burden of building these additional, but
necessary facilities. For example, the original sited state within each
compact could be required to receive waste for thirty years. Reserve
disposal fee momes could then be used to construct the second site.
The new site would then assume disposal responsibilities for thirty
437. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 382-85 and accompanying text.
439. Id.
440. See supra notes 352-55 and accompanying text.

441. See supra notes 243-73 and accompanying text.
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years. The rotation system could thereafter operate based on shorter
intervals, e.g., twenty years, for the remainder of the extended period
during which no additional siting would be required. Compact reserve
coffers could then be replenished.
Therefore, after considering all relevant factors, it should be apparent that a decision to undertake the initial task of siting two tiers of
facilities within each compact would ultimately prove highly beneficial
to a national program for waste disposal. The temporary costs of sitmg pave the path for a long period of lucrative and efficient waste
management and are more than offset by economic mechanisms erected under our plan, the benefits of sharing host liabilities, and the
ready supply of emergency disposal capacity within each compact.
CONCLUSION:

THE CASE FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION RESTATED

The preceding sections have served to demonstrate the fundamental
flaws in the LLRWPAA approach to low-level waste disposal. A
fairly comprehensive proposal has been advanced in order to suggest
several ways in which the existing legislative conceptualization may be
remedied. A recurrent theme throughout this discussion has focused
on the national scope of the waste disposal crisis in the United States
and the many problems which arose when Congress delegated to the
individual states almost unrestricted freedom m devising a waste disposal program. Political turmoil, heavy fines and surcharges, the encouragement of practices potentially harmful to both man and
environment, and the many manifestations of state self-interest are
among the most detrimental consequences which have stemmed from
the lack of strong federal guidance in this field. We have recognized
that, even if the LLRWPAA system can eventually be implemented,
the legislation will produce an economically inefficient, unpredictable
and unreliable compact arrangement which will ultimately prove injurious to the national interest and the interests of individual states, private site operators and waste producers. Therefore, it should now be
clear that we must look to Congress for the implementation of a new
plan.
Strong federal action offers the benefit of unilateral authority to
resolve the many difficult questions we have faced throughout our
analysis in favor of the national interest. The multiplicity of issues
which have emasculated state decision-making processes under the
LLRWPAA could be torn from the consideration of fifty small forums
and definitively addressed, while still allowing input from interested
state officials. Only through federal action can the individual states be
"convinced" to make the sacrifices necessary to achieve a viable solution. Full congressional pre-emption of the low-level waste field promotes the promulgation of immutable rules, timetables and
procedures for developing and adhering to a comprehensive program
for dealing with low-level waste. No longer would states be permitted
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to stall or avoid compliance with the siting process. Timely siting
would occur based on federal mandate rather than according to state
legislative agendas. The waste disposal system would finally be organized to more resemble a well-coordinated machine than an awkward,
fragmented and factional pursuit of state self-interest. 442 The answer
442. Given the numerous provisions advanced in the proposed plan, this note raises
constitutional issues and implications far too extensive to be fully discussed here.
However, the program is likely to be held constitutional. In New York, 112 S. Ct. at
2408, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress has the power to directly regulate
low-level waste disposal under the Commerce Clause, and could clearly preempt conflicting state regulation under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 2419-20.
The modem Supreme Court interpretation of the Commerce Clause is characterized by extreme deference to a Congressional conclusion that it has authority to take
a particular action. The proper inquiry, according to recent decisions, is whether Congress had any "rational basis" for concluding that the regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, and whether the regulatory means selected by Congress
are "reasonably adapted" to the attainment of the permitted end. Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264,276 (1981). The Court has recognized that the commerce power is "broad enough to permit congressional regulation
of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may
have effects in more than one state." Id. at 282 (citations omitted). Another decision
has confirmed that "the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear
safety concerns" through the establishment of the NRC. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983). Justice O'Connor has noted that "it
officials to choose where the
federal
would be well within the authority of.
disposal sites would be." New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2432. In short, there is no question
that Congress may enact many provisions of the proposed plan through direct exercise of its various Article I powers over private activity in the low-level waste field.
To the extent that the proposed federal plan requires state activity, the New York
decision casts doubt on Congress' ability to directly impose the proposed legislation.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), established limits on
federal power based solely on "procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system," id. at 552, suggesting that Congress may have broad latitude in directly regulating state activity according to the proposed scheme. Other cases have
upheld federal statutes which required states to undertake certain actions. See generally South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988) ("That a State wishing to
engage in certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to
comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents
no constitutional defect."); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). However, the majority opimon in
the New York case appears to limit the applicability and scope of the Garcia decision
and similar cases. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2435-46 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Thus, Congress may not be empowered to directly impose
some aspects of the plan, such as the economic provisions, see supra notes 402-30 and
accompanying text.
Nevertheless, even if Congress couldn't constitutionally pass every facet of the plan
directly, it would be permitted to "offer States the choice of regulating [low-level
waste disposal] according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation." New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424 (citations omitted). In United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Supreme Court ratified Congress' use of the so-called
"commerce prohibiting" technique. In that case a federal law, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, sought to enjoin the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber
manufactured by employees whose wages and work hours did not conform to certain
levels imposed by the Act. The Darby Court concluded that Congress was free, regardless of legislative motives, to prohibit the interstate transportation of items in-
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as to whether Congress will undertake this cntical task is left to the
future.
Michael E. Petrella

cluding, but not limited to, "noxious articles." Id. at 114. The commerce power was
viewed as plenary, and the prohibition of interstate shipment was accepted as a valid
means of regulating activities affecting interstate commerce. Therefore, Congress
could stipulate that no low-level waste may be shipped out of any state which refused
to regulate waste disposal according to the means specified by our program. The
prospect of being precluded from sipping any waste out of state would likely generate great political pressure, thus convincing many states to adopt our national disposal
program. Indeed, Justice White, in New York v. United States, observed that Congress could use the threat of a prohibition on the interstate shipment of low-level
waste to induce New York to comply with federal LLRWPAA dictates. New York,
112 S. Ct. at 2445.
An additional valid means by which Congress could "influence" state policy
choices and apply additional pressure on the states to accept the program is found in
the taxing power. Subject to certain limits, see, e.g., United States v. Kahnger, 345
U.S. 22 (1953), a substantial tax could be imposed on private waste generators. Generators would likely complain loudly to state legislatures, and the majority of the
funds obtained from the tax could be subsequently refunded to waste-producers upon
state acceptance of the plan. Finally, Congress could use its spending power, again
subject to limitations, see supra note 122, to withhold a percentage of federal highway
funds and related monies from the states refusing to regulate according to the plan.
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Congress' spending power has long
been interpreted to permit the federal government to employ a conditional use of this
power to convince states to acieve regulatory results Congress could not otherwise
have attained directly.
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APPENDIX A
The purpose of tls section is to demonstrate the ongoing validity of
the figures applied m the text. Table A-1 shows the relative continuity
of total national low-level waste output over the past seven years.

Figures for 1986 through 1989 are derived from the 1989 Annual Report on Radioactive Waste Management Progress, see supra note 4.
Figures for 1990 through 1992 were obtained from "In-House" Reports at Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., Barnwell, South Carolina. See
supra note 135.
Table A-2 demonstrates the relative continuity of total annual lowlevel waste output figures on a state-by-state percentage basis over the
period for which the most complete data was available, 1983 to 1989.
The Table seeks to demonstrate that although total national waste
figures have declined significantly over the extended chosen period,
each state has continued to generate a relatively consistent percentage
of the national total each year. Figures for 1989 are derived from 1989
REPORT, supra note 4. Figures for 1983 are derived from CONFERENCE OF RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM DiREcTORS, INC., THE
1983 STATE BY STATE ASSESSMENT OF LoW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTES SHIPPED TO COMMERCIAL DISPOSAL SrrEs, DOE Document

No. DOE/LLW 39T (1984).
TABLE A-1
YEAR
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

TOTAL WASTE PRODUCED
(In Cubic Feet)
1,805,053
1,841,637
1,427,850
1,625,862
1,143,222
1,369,154
1,741,484
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TABLE A-2
TOTAL ANNUAL WASTE VOLUME, 1983: 2,992,826 cubic feet
TOTAL ANNUAL WASTE VOLUME, 1989:1,625,862 cubic feet
STATE
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvama
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
T-SCORE: -1.48
P-VALUE: .14
1983
1989
DIFF

% OF TOTAL
GENERATED (1983)
5.14
0.00
.932
4A6
.083
.222
.035
2.85
2.30
0.00
7.31
.023
.854
0.00
.087
.018
403
1.58
5.57
1.81
1.48
.055
.271
.002
1.08
0.00
.074
4.28
.046
6.63
5.54
0.00
.952
.075
1.64
9.03
.062
6.60
0.00
5.31
1.92
.102
.751
5.56
1.50
.023
.925
0.00

MEAN
1.825
2.076
-0.252

% OF TOTAL
GENERATED (1989)
3.02
1.95
.512
7.26
.538
3.01
0.84
2.17
2.99
.006
8.19
.132
.372
.319
.617
1.33
.961
2.45
3.47
2.65
1.35
.676
1.15
.006
1.02
.005
.002
3.28
.084
5.94
3.59
.006
3.62
1.97
4.66
7.96
.087
5.94
-0
7.31
1.35
.386
.010
5.09
1.62
.025
.423
-0

MEDIAN
0.803
1.240
-0.015

STD DEV
2.456
2.363
1.175

